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Abbreviations and acronyms
Ceilings are placed on the public
sector wage bill1 to keep it from
pushing up spending or spiralling
out of control. IMF policies have led
to excessively low wage bill ceilings
at the very same time that the World Bank and other
donors are pushing poor countries to rapidly expand
enrolments, so as to achieve the Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) of getting all children into
primary school by 2015. 
This report recognises that wage bill ceilings are
necessary: there are always limits that need to be
set and no government should spend irresponsibly.
However, questions remain unanswered: How are
the ceilings calculated? By whom? Are they too low
as a result?
In all three countries, the IMF exercises considerable
influence in the setting of annual ceilings on the
budget and consequently on the wage bill. A recent
IMF report conceded that between 2003 and 2005 it
included wage bill ceilings as a notable criterion in its
loan arrangements with 17 countries in Asia, Central
America and sub-Saharan Africa, including Malawi,
Sierra Leone and until recently, Mozambique
(Fedelino et al 2006).2 In other countries with an IMF
loan arrangement, the Fund does not directly require
a wage bill ceiling. Instead it targets single-digit
inflation rates and low fiscal deficit levels, effectively
limiting the size of the government budget relative to
gross domestic product (GDP), including the budget
for teachers. Based on these overall budgetary
restrictions, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) may set




The case against the IMF on education
In the world’s poorest countries many children have
gone without quality education for far too long, and
as a result, the human capital that these countries
need to grow and develop sustainably is still in
desperately short supply. One reason is
that the key ingredient to learning is
missing: there are not enough trained
teachers. Our research in Malawi,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone shows
that a major factor behind the chronic
and severe shortage of teachers is that
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
policies have required many poor
countries to freeze or curtail
teacher recruitment. 
1 The public sector wage bill is a line item in any national budget that covers the central government payroll.
2 In four additional countries wage bill conditionality related only to structural reforms – for example, computerising the payroll. 
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workers that can be hired. However, the formula or
criteria used in setting the ceilings remain unclear.
Did the MoF and the IMF assess the number of
teachers needed to ensure quality education? Was
there any analysis of rising enrolment rates in
primary and secondary schools? Was there any
consideration of the impact of these ceilings,
especially on how they discourage girls’ schooling
and compromise long-term development goals? It
seems not. 
The IMF argues that wage bill ceilings are
sometimes necessary when governments lose
control over public sector pay increases or inherit a
civil service bloated by patronage. In such cases,
they say, tight ceilings allow government to cut back
wage spending in non-priority sectors, redirecting
more expenditure to wages in priority sectors
(Fedelino et al 2006). However, in the three countries
studied, the wage bill ceiling appears to be designed
and understood primarily as a tool for achieving IMF
fiscal and monetary conditions, not for increasing
staffing and pay in priority sectors such as
education. And their main impact has been to
prevent or slow the recruitment of new workers, not
just to control pay increases for existing workers. 
Ministries of Education are in the best position to
determine how many teachers are needed and to
predict the impact of not hiring these additional
teachers on the education system. Yet in none of
the three case study countries was the Ministry of
Education directly involved in setting the
wage bill ceiling. Rather it is simply told,
after the decision has been taken, how many
new teachers can be hired. As a senior
education official in Sierra Leone explained,
“It is the ceiling that dictates how many more
teachers we can hire.
Schools tell us their
needs, but we are rarely
able to meet those
requests.”
In examining the basic macroeconomic policies that
require the use of excessively low wage bill ceilings
in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, we
concluded that there are a variety of arguments for
and against these policies. A growing number of
economists worldwide challenge the basic model of
the IMF and highlight areas where government,
alongside civil society, should consider other
options. Regrettably, our case studies indicate that
governments are given neither the policy space nor
the technical support to determine for themselves
the most appropriate macroeconomic policies to
promote equitable growth and achieve national
education goals. Moreover, civil society is not
involved in discussions surrounding macroeconomic
policy. As a result, such policies continue to be
divorced from the reality on the ground, failing to
take into account the persisting teacher shortage
and its devastating impact on the quality of
education.
The IMF claims that wage bill ceilings can be flexibly
applied so as not to impact teachers and health
workers directly. They argue that many other factors
are primarily to blame for the lack of enough
teachers in the classrooms: skewed staff deployment,
corruption (ghost teachers inflating the payroll), skills
shortages, a failure to train enough teachers, and
the lack of predictable donor aid to help finance 
the expansion of the teaching force (Interviews 
with representatives of the IMF and finance and
education ministries in Malawi, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone).
All of these are real constraints, and the findings
from the three countries show that both the
ministries of finance and education and the donor
community are aware of these problems and in
some cases are working to address them. The
solutions will require more investment, not less – for
example in building more teacher training colleges or
providing incentives for rural postings (thus
increasing the wage bill). 
The IMF is correct to point to the notoriously short-
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3 Performance criteria are activities or macroeconomic targets that must be respected for the agreed amount of credit to be disbursed. Indicative targets
are activities or macroeconomic targets that, if not met, alert the IMF that additional measures must be taken to ensure government meets this target in
the future. However, failure to meet such targets will not jeopardise future loan disbursements. 
4 All resources for training were diverted to train the 22,000 untrained teachers that were hired in response to the elimination of user fees under the free
primary education policy. 
aid as a major problem. In all three countries, a
massive upfront investment by donors will be
needed to help finance the large-scale expansion of
the education system and the workforce that is
needed to provide a decent education to every child.
Yet all three countries are massively short of funds
and donors do not have a firm plan for closing the
gap. Governments do not know how and when
additional aid flows might arrive over the next five to
ten years, making it impossible for them to plan for
additional hiring off the back of increased aid. 
At the same time, however, finance ministries and
the IMF must move faster and further to loosen
constraints on public spending so that aid can be
used to expand teacher numbers as well as to build
schools and print textbooks. However, in our three
case study countries there continues to be little or
no discussion – particularly between the IMF, MoF,
Ministry of Education and civil society – around the
level of the wage bill ceiling, and more broadly, how
to balance the need to invest in education for the
future with the desire to maintain fiscal discipline
over the short run.
Malawi has a wage bill ceiling as a performance
criterion, while Sierra Leone and Mozambique have
ceilings as indicative targets (Fedelino et al 2006).3
As of April 2007, all three countries were still
applying a ceiling. It remains a performance criterion
in Malawi’s loan agreement with the IMF and an
indicative target in Sierra Leone’s; in Mozambique it
is still a part of the national budget despite being
dropped from Mozambique’s loan agreement. The
IMF has had varying degrees of influence in setting
the actual wage bill ceilings in all three countries 
and seems to have condoned different degrees of
flexibility in their implementation. In Sierra Leone, 
the IMF determined the level of the ceiling, and the
government placed a cap on the number of teachers
it could hire as a result. In Malawi, the MoF set the
wage bill ceiling based on IMF recommendations to
meet other macroeconomic targets. Although the
education sector is officially exempt from the
recruitment freeze, the Ministry of Education has not
undertaken any pre-service training since 1995, and
as a result there has not been a significant cohort of
new teachers to recruit.4 The most recent poverty
reduction and growth facility (PRGF) also includes 
an automatic ‘adjuster’ to allow for additional wage
spending on health care workers when donor
funding for salaries is larger than expected. 
In Mozambique, under pressure from donors, the
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, the IMF
was forced to remove the wage bill ceiling as an
indicative target and allow the MoF to raise the
ceiling. However, the new ceiling still does not allow
the Ministry of Education to hire the full number of
teachers needed.
Despite the differences between the implementation
of the wage bill ceiling in these three countries, there
were also some striking commonalities. Ministry of
Finance officials from the three countries indicated to
us that the main reason for not raising the wage bill
ceiling was fear that expanding the public sector
workforce would push up inflation beyond the targets
contained in their loan agreement with the IMF. The
IMF may have varying degrees of influence in
directly setting the wage bill ceilings. However,
by insisting on overly restrictive macroeconomic
policies that constrain government spending on
wages, it is in part responsible for the persisting
teacher shortage. In all three countries, the wage
bill ceiling is too low to allow the government to hire
the teachers they need to achieve the pupil-teacher
ratio (PTR) of 40:1 recommended by the Education
for All – Fast-track Initiative (EFA-FTI). There is
considerable evidence that the current ceilings







n The Ministry of Education continues to struggle
with the aftermath of the launch of free primary
education in 1994. The government initially
responded to the huge increase in demand by
hiring 22,000 untrained teachers. Only a handful
of additional new teachers have been hired since
then as there no new teachers have been
received pre-service training in the last 10 years. 
n Though enrolment rates have continued to rise
the quality of education is poor. The PTR remains
high at 72:1. Malawi has the lowest completion
rate for girls and boys of all three c o u n t r i e s
studied: 27% and 32% respectively. To provide
quality primary education, the PTR needs to fall to
40:1 by 2015, which would require government
to hire 90,477 teachers. At the moment 45,268
teachers are employed. 
n There continues to be a wage bill ceiling at 7.2% of
GDP (IMF 2006b); inflation is targeted to decrease
to 5% by 2009/10, and the fiscal deficit target is
expected to fall to 0% in the same period
(Government of Malawi 2005). Ambitiously, the
government hopes to meet these targets by
limiting the size of government expenditure to
39.5% of GDP (IMF 2006b) This will also have the
effect of limiting government expenditure on the
wage bill.
Mozambique
n The rapid expansion of the primary school
system has meant that more children now have
access to a full cycle of primary education.
However, despite some improvement completion
rates remain low, particularly for girls.
n Only 51% of girls enrol into the last two years of
primary education. Of these, only 45% complete
the final year. The national PTR is 74:1 leading to
poor learning environments. For girls and their
families this is another disincentive to send girls
to primary school: others include social and
traditional prejudices; long travelling distances to
school; a lack of appropriate sanitary facilities;
and fear of abuse in schools. As a result few girls
complete primary school, and even fewer
complete secondary – the minimum requirement
to enter a teacher training college. At present less
than 40% of primary teachers are female – an
increase in the number of female teachers is
expected to have a positive impact on girls’
enrolment (Handa 2002). Yet the government
must address the teacher shortage to keep these
girls in school and ensure they receive a quality
education.
n The government will need to hire 109,172
primary school teachers by 2015. Although the
MoF raised the wage bill ceiling from 6.5 to 7.5%
of GDP, with the IMF’s consent it continues to
constrain teacher recruitment in 2007. In 2007,
the Ministry of Education asked for 12,000 extra
teachers to reduce the PTR, but was only
allowed to hire 9,000 and 1,000 administrative
staff. At best on present projections the Ministry
of Education will achieve a 54:1 PTR by 2015.
Sierra Leone
n Sierra Leone is faced with the dual challenge 
of reconstructing schools destroyed during the 
11-year conflict and providing free and quality
education to all children. In recent years there
has been a dramatic, four-fold increase in
enrolment in schools, but this has not been
matched with increases in trained teachers. 
Lack of resources has led to a high PTR of 
57:1. Two-in-five teachers are untrained ‘para-
professionals’ and the attrition rate is high, with
many teachers leaving after four years’ service
due to chronic delay or absence of pay and poor
working conditions. 
n A World Bank-funded project to build additional
schools had to be slowed down, as too many
schools did not have adequate teachers due to 
a cap on teacher hiring. To prevent over-flooding
in this limited number of classrooms, the Ministry
of Education, Science and Technology (MEST)
has set a ceiling on the maximum enrolment for
each school. The result is that children are being
turned away at the schools gates.
n The wage bill ceiling is set at 6.1% of GDP and 
is expected to decrease to 5.9% by 2008. The
number of teachers that could be on the payroll
in 2007 was capped at 33,122 (for all teachers).
Although the IMF has allowed for ‘overruns’ and
for the hiring of approximately 2,000 additional
teachers this year, a total of 28,895 teachers are
required just in primary schools5 to improve the
quality of education by bringing the PTR down 
to 40:1 by 2015. In the 2007 Article IV
Consultations, the IMF emphasised that
“…reining in the wage bill and improving control
of wage expenditures needed to be addressed
with urgency” (IMF 2007 page 15). However,
government officials stressed that managing the
wage bill in the aftermath of a conflict was a
daunting task. They felt compelled to reinstate
displaced civil servants as they return (IMF 2007). 
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5 See the tables in Annex 2. Calculations for Mozambique and Malawi 
are also drawn from the calculations in these tables.
The IMF’s power to effectively shut down foreign aid
means that countries have not dared to challenge
these policies without the support of the donor
community – even if they are not in the best interests
of their citizens. 
We want government officials in ministries of finance
and education, and civil society organisations, to
recognise that the IMF continues to be influential in
determining the level of resources available for
education. We hope they will make use of the
evidence we provide on the limitations of these
policies to challenge the rationale and justification
that underpins the IMF’s approach, and claim back
their own policy space by formulating alternatives.
Maintaining sound public finances is essential – but
macro stability needs to be complimentary to the
achievement of development objectives and rights,
not elevated to an end in itself. 
This report is about confronting the contradictions
between the restrictive macroeconomic policies and
the need to scale up spending to meet education
and other development goals. In recent years, 
many governments (including those of Malawi,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone) have formally
abolished user fees in primary education – a key
step towards achieving universal enrolment. It has
worked: primary enrolments have dramatically
increased. Yet, teacher recruitment and training has
not been able to keep up. Getting more children into
primary school without a corresponding effort to
employ more trained teachers does not fulfil their
right to education. 
Governments and national parliaments, not the IMF,
are best placed to determine this, and to decide
whether to set public sector wage bill ceilings. The
level of these ceilings should enable the achievement
of education and other development goals,
particularly recognising the need to recruit more
teachers, year on year, to ensure that all children
learn in class sizes of 40:1 by 2015.
To achieve this, we make the
following recommendations:
n The IMF should stop attaching specific policy
conditions to their lending and surveillance
programmes, including on inflation levels, fiscal
deficits and wage bills. Any advice they give must
provide a range of policy options to enable
governments and other stakeholders – including
parliaments and civil society – to make informed
choices about macroeconomic policies, wage
bills and the level of social spending. 
n Governments should place education and
development goals at the centre of their macro-
economic planning. They should develop long-
term and costed education plans detailing the
actual need for teachers and resources for 
training in order to provide quality learning
outcomes for all girls and boys 
n Donors need to keep their promises by 
committing to close the annual US$15b financing
gap needed to achieve education for all with
increased and predictable aid over the long term.
There is an urgent need to front-load increases in
aid to education.
n Civil society organisations need to develop their
own economic literacy so they can better scrutinise
government budgets, increase the sensitivity of
budgets to the needs of girls, poor people and
other excluded groups, and engage in discussions




In 2005 ActionAid International published two
reports on the impact of International Monetary Fund
(IMF) policies on government investment in
education, including teacher recruitment.6 Our
research highlighted the glaring contradiction
between low wage bill ceilings and the desperate
need to hire more teachers to achieve the
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and Education
for All (EFA) objective of universal primary school
completion by 2015. 
In 2006, the IMF published a report acknowledging
that it includes wage bill ceilings either as a
performance criterion or as an indicative target in 
21 countries (Fedelino et al 2006). The report
confirmed that, albeit unintentionally, wage bill
ceilings can have a negative impact on the
recruitment of teachers and health workers, given
that these two groups make up such a large portion
of the wage bill. The IMF now claims that it is more
flexible and selective in its use of wage bill ceilings in
low-income countries.
This study takes a closer look at wage bill ceilings 
in three countries: Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra
Leone. All three were cited in the Fedelino report 
as having an explicit wage ceiling either as a
performance criterion or an indicative target in their
loan arrangement.7 Through extensive interviews
with government officials in the Ministry of Finance
(MoF), Central Bank, the Ministry of Education, the
IMF, and civil society organisations (CSOs), we
sought to understand the IMF’s role in directly
setting – or indirectly influencing through broader
macroeconomic policies – the level of wage bill
ceilings. Either way, we found that low wage bill
ceilings have a significant impact on teacher
recruitment in each country. 
The unique contribution of this report is to clearly
demonstrate the link between macroeconomic
policies and the inevitable consequences they have
for the education sector.
We deliberately chose three countries with
seemingly different circumstances in relation to
wage bill ceilings and the associated influence of the
IMF. In Sierra Leone the IMF continues to have a
direct influence in determining the level of the wage
bill ceiling. In the 2007 Article IV Consultations, the
IMF emphasised that “…reining in the wage bill and
improving control of wage expenditures needed to
be addressed with urgency” (IMF 2007, p 15).
However, government officials stressed that
managing the wage bill in the aftermath of a conflict
was a daunting task. They felt compelled to reinstate




The importance of education and 
investment in teachers
6 Marphatia, A and Archer, D. Contradicting commitments: how the achievement of education for all is being undermined by the International Monetary
Fund. ActionAid International, 2005. See www.actionaid.org/assets/pdf/contradicting_commitments4.pdf 
Rowden, R. Changing course: alternative approaches to achieve the millennium development goals and fight HIV/AIDS. ActionAid International USA,
2005. See www.actionaidusa.org/pdf/Changing%20Course%20Report.pdf
7 Performance criteria are activities or macroeconomic targets that must be respected for the agreed amount of credit to be disbursed.
Indicative targets are activities or macroeconomic targets that, if not met, alert the IMF that additional measures must be taken to ensure government
meets this target in the future. However, failure to meet such targets will not jeopardise future loan disbursements.
Despite this concern, the wage ceiling has
led the government to set a specific cap 
on the number of teachers it can hire. In
Malawi, there is still a wage bill cap and
corresponding recruitment freeze on non-
priority sectors. Officially, the education and
health sectors are exempt. However, the
Ministry of Education has not undertaken
any new pre-service training and as a result
there has not been a significant cohort of
new teachers to recruit.8 In Mozambique, 
the wage bill ceiling is no longer an explicit
target in the poverty reduction and growth
facility (PRGF) programme. 
The IMF has shown itself to be flexible in
each of these countries. In Mozambique, 
the wage bill ceiling increased to allow the
recruitment of new teachers. In Malawi, the
IMF is responding to government requests
to adjust wage bill ceilings mid-year. In
Sierra Leone, the IMF has allowed annual
’overruns’ on the wage bill to accommodate
the hiring of more teachers. 
What we ask is whether this flexibility is
enough to allow countries to hire the
required number of teachers to provide
quality primary education. If not, are there
other policies governments can consider 
to allow for a scaling-up of investment in




8 In 2000 the government hired 4,000 teachers; 
all were untrained.
Section 1 
sets the stage. It makes the case for
education and outlines the commitments
that the governments of these and most
countries have made to children, while
recognising the many capacity constraints
they face to recruit more trained teachers
and make effective use of the resources
designated to the education sector. 
Section 2 
explores how the ceilings are calculated
and the extent to which the IMF
macroeconomic framework informs the
level of the wage bill ceiling. 
Section 3 
uncovers the impact low wage bill ceilings
have on the quality of education provided
in schools, taking a global perspective by
illustrating how the dwindling quality of
education in Malawi, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone is but an example of the
experience of most poor countries under
the IMF’s tutelage. 
Section 4 
lays out possible alternative policies that
could better enable countries to select
those macroeconomic policies best suited
to achieve education objectives. 
Section 5 
sets forth recommendations for the IMF,
governments, donors and civil society. 
Graph 1:
The link between female education 
and poverty 
Source: Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey, 2003/4 in Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper 2005, p 24 (as cited in World Bank Education
Sector Review). The poverty line is estimated at SLL 770,648 per year or
US$328 (US$1 per day). 
We now know that countries that fail to invest in
female education will face considerable costs both in
foregone economic growth and in being able to
achieve reductions in fertility, child mortality and
malnutrition. The cost of these to the economy will
increase over time – for example, two-thirds of the
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not on track to
achieve the education MDGs, which jeopardises their
growth. Hill and King (1995) estimate that gross
national product (GNP) in countries where the ratio of
boys to girls enrolled in primary or secondary school
is less than 0.75 can be 25% lower than in countries
with smaller gender disparities in education. They
estimate that countries would have grown on
average 0.1-0.3% faster each year between 1995
and 2005 if they had embarked on education
programmes to achieve gender parity in primary
education goal by 2005. Conversely, Abu-Ghaida
(2004) estimated that failing to invest in education will
lead to 0.4% of growth being forgone between 2005
and 2015, and that proper investment in education
would have increased per capita income by 14% for
the period of 1985 to 2015. 
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1.2 The link between education, 
poverty and economic growth
The importance of education goes beyond national
goals and global commitments. Education is both a
fundamental and an enabling right, which
“…creates the ‘voice’ through which rights can be
claimed and protected” (Watkins 2000). However,
the mere fact that more children go to school does
not mean they will automatically learn. Teachers
must be present, well trained and skilled to provide
equal learning opportunities for both girls and boys:
if not, it is unlikely that children – especially girls –
will achieve acceptable learning outcomes. Without
well-trained teachers children will not master basic
literacy, which will enable them to access the
information and services they need to lead a healthy
and dignified life free of poverty. 
Nowhere is this truer than in the three focus countries
of this study – Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra
Leone. Graph 1 shows how the people of Sierra
Leone – 85% of whom live on less than US$2 a day
– are more likely to rise out of poverty with more
e d u c a t i o n.9 This is especially true in female-headed
households, which research shows are more likely to
spend their income on education, health and food. A
similar situation is reproduced worldwide. 
According to Malhotra et al (2003), an educated,
skilled and knowledgeable workforce – especially if
women have equal opportunity to contribute – is one
foundation for sustained growth. The government of
Malawi (2006) claims that “…education is the key for
attaining prosperity. It is a catalyst for socio-
economic development, industrial growth and an
instrument for empowering the poor, the weak and
the voiceless.” Even the IMF’s own research shows
the positive impact of education on economic
growth: “An increase in education spending of 1
percent of GDP is associated with three more years
of schooling on average and a total increase in
growth of 1.4 percentage points in 15 years”
(Baldacci et al 2004). Similarly, a 1% increase in
enrolment rates yields a 0.1% increase in per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) growth. 
9 The UNDP’s Human Development Index 2007 ranks Sierra Leone second-to-last on a scale of 177 countries. 
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equal participation and success in the classroom.
Only trained teachers can provide the high quality of
education required to lead to higher economic
growth. Box 1 shows why investing in teachers and
providing them training and support is not only
necessary, it also makes good economic sense.
Acquiring skills and knowledge is the first step. The
ripple effect of education is felt most when people are
able to access and take advantage of opportunities
to apply their skills to productive sectors, making the
economy grow. The benefits of education to
agricultural development are particularly significant
because this sector employs the majority of people –
especially women – in the poor, agrarian-based
economies in sub-Saharan Africa. The agriculture
sector makes a sizeable contribution to the gross
domestic product (GDP) of the three countries we
studied – for example, 40% in Sierra Leone (IMF
2007a). Investing in education will boost agricultural
production and therefore lead to greater economic
growth. It is once again the investment in female
education that contributes most to higher agricultural
productivity. For example, a study looking at
household incomes in Ghana finds that one additional
year of schooling increases on-farm productivity by 1-
3%, and off-farm productivity by 6-11%, depending
on the specification of the model (Jolliffe 2004). 
All of these aspects are particularly significant in
countries where agricultural development is a key
strategy. The findings suggest that education –
particularly for girls at primary level – is a prerequisite
to maximise the opportunities presented by
agricultural development and can contribute
s i g n i ficantly to economic growth. And of course,
greater economic growth provides governments with
more domestic resources to channel into education,
health, and HIV and AIDS. In Malawi it is expected
that agriculture will provide the central thrust for
economic growth. The Ministry of Agriculture’s
Director of Planning stated that agricultural
modernisation is fundamentally dependent upon
education. “We have been concerned by the limited
take-up of modernisation techniques. It is only people
who have at least primary education who are
adopting these techniques.” 
Box 1: 
Why investing in teachers makes 
good economic sense
To get high-quality education, the empowerment of
women and higher economic growth, it is necessary
to invest in the ‘full package’. This means an
adequate number of female and male teachers,
liveable wages, housing and transport allowances,
training opportunities, school infrastructure (including
toilets) and appropriate teaching materials. Returns
on education depend not just on years of education,
but on the actual skills and cognitive abilities
acquired. Glewe (2002) finds that measures of
cognitive skills are a strong determinant of earnings;
while ICRW (2005) finds that a combination of years
of schooling and good quality education leads to the
empowerment of women and brings about greater
returns on education. However, these do not come
automatically – the quality of instruction and levels of
teacher motivation both affect students’ ability and
success in school (Lee and Barro 2001; López-
Acevedo 2004). In addition to providing adequate
pre- and in-service training, it is essential to remove
other obstacles that undermine the capacity of
teachers – such as low wages, lack of housing and
transportation – and support the progression of
female teachers. Similarly, it is important to provide
an environment that is conducive to learning, by
providing materials, teacher aids and smaller class
sizes. In particular, increasing the pupil-teacher ratio
(PTR) has been shown to have a significant negative
effect on attainment, the probability of employment
and returns on education for students. A study in
South Africa found that increasing the PTR by five
students led to a 1% decrease in pupils’ wage-
earning potential (Case and Yogo 1999). Evidently the
PTR is determined by the number of teachers that are
employed. UNESCO’s Institute of Statistics (UIS) has
estimated that 18 million teachers are needed
globally between now and 2015 to achieve
acceptable PTRs (UNESCO 2006a). 
However, investment in building schools, good
teaching-learning materials and programmes to
support the higher enrolment of girls (such as
stipends) will not automatically lead to higher
economic growth. It is the learning process, how
good a teacher is, and how well s/he has mastered
basic teaching skills and techniques, that ensure
In Sierra Leone the disenfranchisement of youth – mostly due to a lack of education –
was one of the root causes of the civil war. After peace was established in 2002, the
government promptly set out to re-establish education as a right, and abolished user
fees. However, with demand surging, the government faces the dual challenge of
reconstructing schools, most of which were destroyed during the war, and providing
quality inputs at the school level – for example, an adequate number of trained
teachers, teaching and learning materials. It also must find a way to provide education to the thousands
of children and youth who have had no schooling due to the war and those who were maimed and
disabled. The government has resorted to short-cuts – such as hiring untrained and unqualified teachers
– to deal with increased enrolment. Precise data is hard to find, as data systems were destroyed during
the war. This makes it difficult to gain an accurate and complete picture of education and the different
experiences of girls and boys. 
Although the government of Mozambique has set education as a national priority since independence
was achieved in 1975, the ensuing civil war (1977-1992) undermined its investment in education. Enrolment
rates have been steadily rising for girls and boys since the end of the war, but teacher recruitment and
school construction have not been able to keep up, leading to overcrowded classrooms and the use of
untrained teachers. The recent floods and cyclones in early 2007 damaged around 1,000 classrooms in 
the provinces of Tete, Zambézia, Manica and Inhambane. The government needs to rebuild these
classrooms while meeting the rising demand for new schools and more teacher training colleges. In
addition, as enrolment rates and completion rates for primary continue to rise, there is mounting pressure
on government to expand the secondary school system. This would require not only the construction of
more secondary schools, but also the recruitment of more secondary school teachers.
In Malawi, the Ministry of Education is still struggling to re-establish itself after its tarnished dealings with
corruption during the last administration. It is also still grappling with the aftermath of the launch of
universal free education in 1994, when enrolment surged and government schools struggled to cope.
There has been some progress in classroom construction and textbook provision – and the government
has recruited 22,000 untrained teachers to respond to the new demand. However, these teachers have
not been given adequate in-service training and the quality of schools remains poor. Drop-out rates are
high and completion rates low. One donor representative went so far as to call the last 10 years a “…lost
decade for education in Malawi”. A member of local health organisation the Malawi Health Equity
Network asked: “Where are we heading to? We’ve lost direction as a country with respect to education.” 
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1.3 The state of education and
teachers in Malawi, Mozambique
and Sierra Leone
The link between education, poverty reduction,
agricultural development and economic growth is
very strong in all three focus countries for this study.
Governments have recognised this and are currently
developing 10-year education sector plans.
Nevertheless, the potential of education to reduce
poverty and bring about greater growth 
is constrained by: the dismal state of education;
disparities in enrolment and achievement between
girls and boys; the chronic shortage of trained
teachers; and a challenging social and economic
context. In this section we summarise the state 
of the education system in Malawi, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone, to identify the changes that need to be
made, and how macroeconomic policies can play a
central role in bringing about positive change. 
Table 1: 
Primary education in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone
Net Enrolment Current Universal Primary Drop-out rates Completion Transition to
Ratio (NER) pupil-teacher Completion (UPC) grade 1* rates secondary
ratio target pupil-teacher 
ratio
Malawi 95% 72:1 60:1 22% for girls 30% 47% girls
(2006) 98% girls and boys 27% girls 41% boys **
32% boys
Mozambique 71% 74:1 54:1 14% girls 57.2% 62% girls
(2006/7) 67% girls 12.6% boys 49% girls 61% boys
65% boys
Sierra Leone 63% 57:1 45:1 n/a 60% 76% girls
(2003/4) 45% girls 47.6% girls 78% boys
63.9% boys
Sources:
Different sources were used to find this data. Most comes from
government documents but some are from other international sources. 
* grade 1 drop-out rates from Global Education Monitoring Report 2007.
** calculated as the total secondary first grade intake for 2006 as a
percentage of primary grade 8 pupils who sat the primary leavers exam
in 2005.
Other data from:
Mozambique: Ministry of Education and Culture, Education Database;
2005 figures.
Sierra Leone: Net enrolment ratio from Household Survey 2003/4.
Completion data for 2004, from World Bank Education Sector Review
2006; Sierra Leone Integrated Livelihoods and Household Survey
2003/4. Transition data from Ministry of Education and Vocational
Training, Education Statistics 2006; remaining figures from PRSP
Review 2007.
Although enrolment rates in primary education have
increased, the results on learning achievement have
been mixed. Table 1 shows that, although there is
disparity in net enrolment rates between the three
countries (in Malawi it is as high as 95%10 while in
Sierra Leone it remains low at 63%), they all have
high drop-out, low completion and poor transition
rates to secondary school, indicating that that
children are not staying in school long enough to
gain basic literacy skills. This becomes even more
apparent when looking at the PTR, which is well
above the recommended class size of 40 or less,
adopted by the World Bank and donor community
as a standard for developing countries, in response
to compelling research that shows deterioration in
the quality of teaching and learning where class
sizes exceed this figure. 
Moreover, there are concerns that some of the data
disguises deeper problems, such as the use of
automatic promotion instead of the previous
practice of testing children at the end of each year
and making them repeat the year if they failed. In
Mozambique, for example, automatic promotion in
grades 1, 3, 4, and 6 has considerably reduced
repetition rates and raised promotion rates (Republic
of Mozambique 2005a), disguising the underlying
issues of negligible learning attainment.
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A key reason for poor levels of learning is the lack of
skilled teachers. The shortage of qualified teachers
and the vast numbers of untrained teachers already
working in schools are impacting on the quality of
education not only in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra
Leone, but in increasing numbers of low-income
countries worldwide. To get all children into school in
class sizes of less than 40, sub-Saharan Africa, which
currently has 2.4 million teachers, will need to increase
this number by 68%, to 4 million teachers (UNESCO
2006a). However, getting more teachers in schools is
more complicated than just finding the resources to
hire them. There are several other hurdles in the
education sector that must also be addressed:
10 This is taken from the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007. Note that this number differs from the data held by the Government Of Malawi, the EMIS
data of 2006 stating that the NER is over 100%.  Given that this is by definition impossible this alternative number is used for the purposes of
comparison.
High rates of attrition: Attrition of primary
teachers is very high in Malawi and Sierra Leone, with
many leaving after just five and four years of service
respectively. The total number of teachers has fallen
in Malawi during the last three years: between 2000
and 2004, about 1,000 teachers per year left the
profession or died (many of AIDS-related illnesses). 
A further 2,071 teachers were lost in 2006
(Government of Malawi 2006) – at least 25% to
AIDS-related sickness or death. Low salaries are
another key driver of attrition: while the government
considers the salary rate reasonable, an independent
costing exercise in 2005 revealed that the basic
salary of a trained teacher was MK 7,700 (US$55),
while the minimum wage required to buy a basket of
primary goods was MK 15,000 (US$107).11
Weak capacity to train: The government of
Mozambique has lacked the capacity to adequately
train all teachers, leaving 38% of teachers without
professional training. In response, the Ministry of
Education implemented the new teacher-training
programme that requires only one year of training
after completing Grade 10, rather than two. This
measure has nearly doubled teacher training
capacity. Previously only 3,500 teachers completed
training per year; now close to 6,000 teachers will
complete pre-service training. There is a great deal of
concern however, from civil society and even within
the Ministry of Education that, unless the quality of
pre-service training is significantly improved, this
training scheme will undermine efforts to improve
quality by hiring more teachers. More resources are
needed to bolster the new teacher training courses,
to ensure that quality is not compromised. But short
cuts on training are not the answer. 
Lack of female teachers: There are not enough
female teachers, which directly impacts on the already
low number of girls that enrol, attend and succeed in
school (Handa 2002; Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a;
Republic of Mozambique 2005 and 2005a). In
addition, Unterhalter (2007) found that the low
proportion of women teachers correlates with other
aspects of gender inequality in education (low levels of
primary and secondary enrolment rates, low retention,
and the lack of women involved in public decision-
making) in both Malawi and Mozambique. In Sierra
Leone and Malawi, approximately 30% of primary and
20% of secondary teachers are female (Republic of
Sierra Leone 2007a; World Bank 2005a; Government
of Malawi 2006). In Mozambique, the presence of
female teachers is a significant factor in determining
demand for primary education (Handa 2002). 
Unequal distribution of teachers: In principle
this is true in all three countries, where PTRs range
widely. For example, the PTR in Sierra Leone’s
Southern Region is 56:1; in the Eastern Region it
74:1 (Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a). However,
redistributing teachers to rural areas – where PTR 
is highest and female teachers are the lowest in
number – is costly. Incentives and allowances 
such as housing allocation, living stipends, and
transportation costs are required to attract trained
teachers to under-served areas. The most common
solution used by countries including Sierra Leone 
is to recruit people from the community to teach.
However, most people in rural areas have barely
completed two-three years’ schooling; they are not
prepared or equipped to teach and when they do,
the quality of education decreases. 
Lack of a credible database on teachers:
Sierra Leone lacks a central database to properly
account for the number of teachers in service and
their qualifications. Mozambique has three different
civil servant databases, all of which provide different
information on the number of teachers needed. This
causes several problems, not only for accurately
projecting how many additional teachers are needed
and where, but also for calculating the cost of hiring
them. In particular, there are many complaints that
the wage bill is inflated as a result of ghost workers
who continue to appear on the wage bill, but are not
active employees. In Sierra Leone, ghost teachers
are one consequence of the war, and often cited as
a reason to keep teacher numbers, wage bill
ceilings, and recurrent costs low. However, what is
not revealed is that there are probably an equal




11 These figures are from the Centre for Social Concern (2005), as reported to us by the Malawi’s Coordinator of the Civil Society Coalition for Quality
Basic Education.
These are all absorptive capacity constraints that limit
the government’s capacity to recruit and deploy more
teachers effectively. However, they can all be seen to
stem from an accumulated lack of sufficient investment
in the education system over many years. There is
evidence in all three countries studied that the
governments are serious about dealing with these
capacity constraints, but to do so properly and
effectively requires more – not less – funding. It would be
wrong to use these capacity issues as a reason not to
increase investment: that would simply perpetuate the
problem of absorptive capacity. Speaking in
Mozambique, Jeffrey Sachs acknowledged that the
country could achieve the MDGs if only more resources
were made available. He was critical of donors and the
IMF claiming that “PARPA II1 2 is not ambitious enough,
and we know why…The backing of the international
community is not there. They say ‘Don’t go too fast. You
haven’t got the absorptive capacity.’” As a result, he
says, they are reluctant to scale up funding for greater
investment in social sectors (cited in Hanlon 2005). 
Our findings suggest that countries faced with
constrained budgets are making difficult choices and
pursuing less than ideal solutions. With rising enrolment
rates and a shortage of teachers, governments are
hiring greater numbers of untrained or unqualified
t e a c h e r s. Close to 40% of primary school teachers in
Sierra Leone and Mozambique are untrained (Republic
of Sierra Leone 2007a; Republic of Mozambique 2006).
In Malawi, like most countries, untrained teachers were
hired to quickly respond to the surge of enrolment
brought on by the elimination of user fees. Hiring
untrained teachers has become official policy in Sierra
Leone, where the wage scale for teachers is divided into
11 categories, based on level of education and training
(Republic of Sierra Leone 2006b). Similarly, in
Mozambique the government is implementing a new
one-year training scheme; the Ministry of Education then
pays these new teachers less than those with two years
of training. Overall, the lack of training is having a
detrimental impact on the quality of teaching and thus
learning (Independent Evaluation Group 2006).
Unfortunately all three countries lack the capacity to
adequately provide in-service training to the vast
number of unqualified teachers and train new teachers.
In sum, the governments of Malawi, Mozambique
and Sierra Leone will have to overcome enormous
challenges if all children are to gain a quality
education. Adopting a long-term education plan 
is a step forward. However, securing adequate
investment to fully fund this plan is another thing
altogether. Although Mozambique spends 20% of 
its total budget (6% of GDP) on education, it still
has a financing gap of US$26 million in 2007;
around 30% of the education budget is fin a n c e d
through external sources.1 3 Both Malawi and Sierra
Leone spend under the recommended levels. In
Malawi, education accounted for 11% of the
national budget – 3.5% of GDP – in 2006/7
(Government of Malawi 2006a). In Sierra Leone,
education occupies 19% of the total budget, or
4.9% of GDP. Domestic public spending represents
35% of total spending, donors contribute about
22%, and households finance 44% of costs despite
education being supposedly fee-free since 2003.
The estimated financing gap to meet UPC by 2015
is $28.4 million per annum; the total recurrent
financing gap to meet the 45:1 PTR between 2007-
2015 is $254 million. In order for Sierra Leone to
meet this projected PTR of 45:1(which is higher
than the FTI-recommended 40:1) by 2015, 5.5% of
GDP will need to be spent on education: that
means that 47.7% of recurrent costs will be spent
on primary education alone (Republic of Sierra
Leone 2007a). 
Given these funding gaps, it is essential to create an
enabling environment that allows for a scaling-up of
both donor and government investment in
education. However, this requires deliberate and
unwavering attention to a host of constraints, some
of which go well beyond the education sector. The
level of investment in education and potential to
increase it will depend on countries’ ability to
generate more domestic resources and on the
volume, predictability and sustainability of external
aid that can be spent on education. Both these
variables are determined in part by fiscal and
monetary policies. Are these designed to support
growth, revenue generation and absorption of aid? 
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12 PARPA II is Mozambique’s national action plan to reduce absolute poverty 2006-2009.
13 Though over 50% of the national budget is supported through direct budget support.
1.4 The macroeconomic framework
in Malawi, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone  
The macroeconomic framework of these and most
low-income countries is heavily influenced and
guided by the IMF. All three countries are pursuing
single-digit inflation rates and low fiscal deficit levels.
In Malawi, these restrictive macroeconomic policies
were necessary initially to rein in excessive and
irresponsible government spending. Following the
end of the civil war in 2001, the government of
Sierra Leone has followed IMF advice, curtailing
government expenditure to ensure macroeconomic
stability, bringing inflation rates down from 12.1% in
2005 to 5 % in 2008. In 1987 Mozambique signed
its first loan arrangement with the IMF as the country
transitioned from a planned to market economy. The
economic policies implemented during this period
have continued to date. 
However, all three countries have now reached a
reasonable degree of stability, with strong positive
growth of 5-6% per year, and annual inflation of 
9-12%. Accordingly, these countries should now 
be turning their attention to achieving their broader
social and economic goals, including the MDGs. An
economist interviewed in Sierra Leone explained: “A
major question facing Sierra Leone is how to ensure
macroeconomic stability, generate employment,
restore growth and increase investment in education
and healthcare. A post-conflict economy like Sierra
Leone’s faces some very hard trade-offs. The need
to control inflation and debt may dictate austerity
measures, which may run counter to social policy
priorities and popular expectations of peace.
Further, too tight a budget can lead to deflation and
unemployment, especially while private investment is
still very low.” 
However, when asked whether expenditure could be
increased in the education sector to pursue these
goals, the response of the finance and planning
ministries in all three countries was: “…not at the
expense of macrostability”. It became clear that few
government officials had a sense of what
macrostability meant, other than meeting PRGF
targets. Many officials expressed confusion at the
justification for the levels set in their programmes.
One senior official from the Reserve Bank of Malawi,
stated that the levels were “based on a rule of
thumb”, and yet expressed a deep concern about
moving away from these levels. It became abundantly
clear that the levels set in the PRGF programmes
help to define the fiscal space available for the
consideration of additional education expenditure,
and that these indicators constitute a primary
determinant of planned education expenditures. 
It is therefore essential to understand the rationale
for, and implications of, these macroeconomic
targets and the theories that underlie them when
considering the room for scaling up education
expenditure in order to recruit additional teachers. 
Jenny Matthews / ActionAid
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2.1 Setting wage bill ceilings
“There is a desperate need for greater policy coherence
in a period when many governments, including
Washington, are sensibly exhorting African governments
to spend more on primary health care and education
while international institutions largely controlled by
those same Western governments have been pressing
African countries to shrink their government payrolls,
including teachers and health workers.” 
‘Africa at the Summit’, New York Times editorial, 
4 July 2005.
Hiring and paying teachers is a domestic obligation.
Their salaries – like those of health workers, ministry
staff and those working in other government-run
services – are covered through a line item on the
national budget called the public sector wage bill.
This wage bill makes up a sizeable share of recurrent
expenditure – 50% in Mozambique; 25% in Malawi; and
43.8% in Sierra Leone (Ministry of Finance 2006),
and therefore of the overall budget. Teachers and
health workers are usually the most expensive item
on the wage bill because of their sheer numbers. The
percentages of the wage bill going to teachers’ salaries
were: 37% in Malawi; 35% in Mozambique; and 35%
in Sierra Leone (Ministry of Finance 2006). Similarly, the
teacher wage bill consumes an important percentage
of the GDP: 2.7% in Malawi and Mozambique and
4.5% in Sierra Leone (Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a). 
Therefore, controlling the wage bill is a convenient way
of controlling the total budget size. Because the wage
bill is primarily financed through domestic resources, if
GDP fails to grow as projected, or decreases, less is
available to spend on wages. Any target for the overall
budget size will also inevitably present a limit on the
size of the wage bill. Because teachers and health
workers occupy the largest portion of the wage bill,
any changes in the total wage bill will inevitably impact
upon them. 
Placing a ceiling on the wage bill is customary and
makes financial sense: it is important to ensure that the
wage bill does not spiral out of control. In Malawi, the
government has previously struggled to control wage
increases and recruitment, so it saw a payroll cap as a
healthy measure to enforce budget discipline. Further,
the IMF maintains that a ballooning wage bill can lead to
macroeconomic instability in the short term, either by
crowding out other government expenditure, pushing
up total government expenditure or causing a wage-
price spiral in the whole economy, which could lead to
further inflation (Fedelino et al 2006). Accordingly, a
wage bill ceiling is often included as a performance
criterion or indicative target in the PRGF. 
However, despite the seemingly solid rationale for
constraining the growth of the civil service, it is important
to look carefully at how the ceiling is calculated, which
information is used in these calculations and the level at
which the ceiling is set. There is also, in effect, an indirect
ceiling on the wage bill. A stringent ceiling on overall
government spending will, by default, result in a limit on
the wage bill ceiling. The IMF maintains that country
governments set wage bill ceilings, not the IMF. 
This is not strictly true for our country studies:
n In Malawi, the wage bill ceiling, currently set at
7.2% of GDP, is a performance criterion:
breaching this ceiling would take the country 
off-track with its PRGF. 
n The wage bill ceiling in Sierra Leone is set as an
indicative target, but because it is so stringent the
government was forced to place a cap on the
recruitment of new teachers. In this case it is indeed
the government that decided to place a cap on
teachers, though it was a result of the recommended
IMF ceiling on the wage bill. In order to enable better
control of the wage bill, in 2006 a structural




Setting the wage bill: teacher need 
vs macroeconomics
‘reconciling data’ between the government and the
IMF. When the IMF mission comes to town, they
compare their data with that of the government and
adjust their data so they agree on the macro targets.
It is only at the end that policies are discussed and
that the real economy is considered.” 
Lack of consultation
What is clear, however, is that the Ministry of
Education is not involved in establishing the level of
the ceiling or cap, and the needs of the sector are
not systematically considered when setting wage bill
ceilings or total expenditures. Rather, the ministries
deals with the consequences, allocating teachers
around the country once the ceiling is set. In Sierra
Leone for example, very rarely did the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (MEST) furnish
information on its needs; the deficit of teachers; their
qualification and training levels; or their salary scales
before the cap was calculated. Further, few staff in
the ministries of education have the confidence,
capacity or opportunity to challenge this situation,
and propose alternatives: they are expected to
accept decisions taken by the MoF regarding the
number of teachers they can hire. In Malawi, efforts
to lobby for additional education spending have
fallen on deaf ears – a cause of frustrations for
parliamentarians. With increasing confidence – partly
as a result of economic literacy training – they have
sought to challenge the Ministry of Finance on this.
However, the stringent macroeconomic framework
pursued to date has meant that there is no room for
negotiation. Yet if education is only 15% of the
budget there would seem to be some room for




14 In Sierra Leone the IMF views the wage bill as being ‘high’, absorbing 55% of domestic revenues. It is considered to be above the ECOWAS average.
civil service employees including teachers. 
n In Mozambique, the PRGF no longer includes a
wage bill cap per se; however, stringency within
the budget means that the government has
continued to set a tight wage bill ceiling and even
more restrictive monetary and fiscal targets. 
Mystery formula = no accountability
So what information is used to set the ceilings, and
is the shortage of teachers and health workers taken
into consideration? Interviews with staff from the
education and finance ministries in the three
countries revealed that the level of the direct wage
bill ceiling is based, not on any estimate of need, but
on arbitrary international averages.14 This differed
from country to country – 6.1% of GDP in Sierra
Leone; 7.5% in Mozambique and 7.2% in Malawi. In
Sierra Leone it will fall slightly over the period (from
6.1% in 2005 to 5.9% in 2008). What could the
rationale for this be, when the sector plans for these
countries call for dramatic increases in the number
of teachers, if only to keep apace with growing
enrolments? No one that we interviewed knew
exactly where their wage bill target came from, and
the IMF had provided no justification for how it had
been calculated, or what comparison was used.
The ceiling on the total budget is calculated by using
a macroeconomic projections model. However, in 
all three countries there was considerable ambiguity
around the actual formulas used – for example, in
Malawi senior officials in the Ministry of Finance
referred us to the Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development for a copy of the macroeconomic
model, who in turn referred us to the Ministry of
Finance for the same! We found similar ambiguity
around the actual formulas used in the other two
countries too. Overall, we found that IMF programme
documents failed to spell out the underlying rationale
or justification for a particular policy stance, making
it difficult for others to comment and challenge (IEO
2003) – a fact that also complicates mid-course
corrections (Goldsbrough 2006). In Mozambique a
government official noted that, “The process of
setting macro policies is one that mostly consists of
2.2 Macroeconomic justifications 
for the wage bill 
“Wage bill ceilings usually provide only a short-term
fix…but ultimately do not resolve the
macroeconomic pressures they try to address”
(Fedelino et al 2006). 
A macroeconomic framework with a tight focus on
inflation, fiscal deficit rates and ceilings on public
expenditure, will constrain the number of teachers
and health workers government can employ. This
creates trade-offs that directly impact on people’s
lives and influence the future development path of
the country as a whole. It is therefore essential that
governments have a range of robust options to
consider, and that the final choices rest with elected
governments accountable to the people, not with
international financial institutions. However, the
IMF’s approach encourages nations to believe
that there is just one truth, one concept of
macroeconomic stability and that this is an on-off
position, stable or unstable, on-track or off-track.
The findings of a recent Independent Evaluation
Office (IEO) report show that the same ‘switch point’
approach affects the absorption of donor aid (see
Box 2, page 16). 
Nevertheless a growing number of economists are
challenging the restrictive nature of fiscal and
monetary policies promoted by the IMF and
questioning whether very low levels of inflation and
fiscal deficits are relevant and appropriate for low-
income countries. This has a direct effect on the
validity of wage bill caps and expenditure ceilings
and therefore, the employment of additional
teachers. 
The following discussion is by no means a
comprehensive assessment of macroeconomic
theory. Our intention is to draw attention to the
diversity of opinion that exists in relation to some 
of the macroeconomic factors that countries are
encouraged to adhere to, with the hope that this
will enable countries to question, challenge and
reach their own view as to the right path for their
country. 
2 . 2 . 1 Are single-digit inflation rates the best
policy for all low-income countries? 
“The 7% rule is a rule for ordinary times, but these
are not ordinary times”, senior official, Ministry of
Finance, Malawi. 
The primary mission of the IMF is to maintain
‘macroeconomic stability’, which, according to their
definition, involves countries having “…current-
account and fiscal balances consistent with low and
declining debt levels, inflation in the low single digits
and rising per capita GDP” (IMF 2001). According to
the IMF, levels of inflation above 10% may hurt poor
people because they raise the prices of basic
consumer goods, drive away foreign investors, and
undermine the prospects for future economic
growth rates (IMF 1997). The main way to achieve
this target inflation rate has been to quickly drive
inflation from relatively moderate levels down into the
very low single-digits, often by cutting public spending
and raising short-term interest rates. Once this lower
target for the inflation rate is attained, countries 
must do everything possible to maintain it. Current
inflation targets are set at 6% in Mozambique, 
7.4% in Malawi, and 9.3% in Sierra Leone, all three
countries inflation is expected to fall to 5% by
2009/10 (IMF 2006). Similarly, as shown in Table 3
(see page 25) in this report, all 23 countries reviewed
had inflation targets well below 10%; 20 of them
below 5%. As Box 2 (see page 16) shows, in many
low-income countries a standard 5% inflation target
that has long characterised the central goal of IMF
stabilisation programmes continues to determine
spending and aid levels (IEO 2007). 
However, economists disagree regarding the level 
at which inflation negatively impacts poverty and
growth. While some argue that countries with single-
digit inflation grow faster than countries with
moderately higher inflation, there is competing
evidence that long-term growth is not affected by
moderate double digit inflation (Chang and Grabel
2004). 
Indeed, many studies claim that squeezing
economies through low single-digit inflation rates in
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order to reduce demand and government spending
has actually resulted in slower growth for the
poorest countries (Spiegel 2006, Weisbrot et al
2005, World Bank 2005, GAO 2001, Barro 1996).
Pollin and Zhu (2005) conclude that “…there is no
justification for inflation-targeting policies as they are
currently being practiced throughout the middle-
and low-income countries, that is, to maintain
inflation within a 3-5 percent band.”
Even the World Bank – the IMF’s sister agency in
Washington – found that inflation rates below 20%
had no obvious negative impacts for long-term
economic growth rates in 127 countries from 1960
to 1992 (cited in Bruno 1995). This research
indicates that maintaining moderate inflation rates
would not necessarily jeopardise macroeconomic
stability, while accommodating higher public
spending on priority sectors, such as education.
Similarly, a World Bank study found that “…the
search for macro stability, narrowly defined, may in
some cases have actually been inimical to growth.
Preoccupation with reducing inflation quickly
induced some countries to adopt exchange rate
regimes that ultimately conflicted with the goal of
outcomes-based stability. Others pursued macro
stability at the expense of growth enhancing policies
such as adequate provision of public goods, as well
as of social investments that might have both
increased the growth payoff and made stability more
durable” (World Bank 2005).
In countries such as Malawi and Mozambique, that
have stabilised and are now aiming for greater
economic growth, the pursuit of single digit inflation
rates may be especially harmful. Mozambique, for
example, has consistently experienced inflation rates
at moderate levels of 10-12% over the course of the
past five years. Yet the government feels it must
push inflation down further to 6% for fear that
maintaining present levels will jeopardise
macroeconomic stability. The IMF argues that at
moderate rates of inflation, there is a greater risk that
it could quickly spiral out of control (Roger and
Stone 2005). Mozambique’s recent track record
shows that this has not been the case. If moderate
inflation rates of 10-20% were accepted to
constitute a ’stable’ economy as many economists
argue, it would allow Mozambique greater flexibility
and fiscal space in the coming years, enabling them
to increase public spending.
The IMF is concerned that increasing the wage bill
ceiling by hiring more teachers will lead to inflation
(Fedelino et al 2006). When government increases
the wage bill – either by hiring new employees or
raising salaries – it is in effect putting more money
into people’s pockets, causing an increase in the
demand of goods. However, in the short term the
amount of goods available remains unchanged. Until
suppliers produce more goods to satisfy the new
demand, prices will rise, causing inflation. Therefore,
if government trying to meet a single-digit inflation
target, it must strictly manage spending on the wage
bill in order to achieve target inflation rates and so
cannot afford to take the risk of hiring new teachers. 
However, in all three countries, we found that wages
were not blamed for rising rates of inflation. It was
universally stated – by the IMF and government alike
– that the main drivers for inflation are weather
shocks, such as droughts, which damage agricultural
production, or oil price hikes. In Mozambique, while
the wage bill did increase in 2003, it was noted that
the main reason the country failed to meet the 10.8%
i n flation target was due to a rise in food prices as a
result of the drought the previous year (Republic of
Mozambique 2004). Like rising oil prices, this was
out of the government’s control.
The fundamental point is that economic policy
choices – such as what level of inflation is
permissible – always involve trade-offs. Allowing
inflation to rise will erode the purchasing power of
wage earners while delivering a windfall to wealthy
asset-owners. Keeping it low by raising interest rates
leads to unemployment, which penalises the poor
and uneducated, especially women;15 while reducing
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15 A cross-country study showed that “…the working class broadly defined, and those with lower occupational skill and status are more likely to prioritize
combating unemployment rather than inflation” (Jayadev 2006). Women are often the first to be laid off (Elson and Cagatay 2000), partly because their
literacy levels are so much lower than those of men. In Mozambique illiteracy is still much higher among women (68.8%) than men (36.7%) (Republic of
Mozambique 2005b).
inflation by shrinking government spending will often
require cutbacks in services that the poor rely on,
such as education and healthcare provision. Higher
food prices will be good for rural small-holders and
bad for urban slum dwellers. Whatever the
outcomes, they will have very significant political and
social costs for some segments of the population.
IMF conditionality effectively denies governments the
right and responsibility to make these tough choices,
thereby depriving them of one of the most important
tools they have to balance the interests and needs
of different sectors of society, and undermining the
very fabric of democracy. Given the choice, poor
people – particularly poor women – might actually
prefer moderately higher inflation if it accommodates
for better government services and greater
employment opportunities. However, IMF
conditionality leaves little policy space within
government to negotiate these trade-offs, and few
opportunities for citizens or their elected
representatives to voice their preference. 
2.2.2 Expanding fiscal space: how can a
country scale up spending to meet
social sector goals?16 
The amount a government can spend is based on
its capacity to finance expenditures from current and
future revenues. The amount of revenue available to
government defines fiscal space, an idea that is
closely linked to the concept of fiscal sustainability.
The IMF defines fiscal sustainability as “…the
capacity of a government, at least in the future, to
finance its desired expenditure programs, to service
any debt obligations…and to ensure its solvency”
(Heller 2005). In other words, any expenditure by a
government over and above its own current
revenues – called the fiscal deficit – requires an
increase in fiscal space in the future. 
Spending on government wages has serious
implications for fiscal sustainability, as government
wages are considered to be a recurrent or permanent
cost. By hiring more teachers now, a government is
committing to continue paying their salaries.
Accordingly, government must guarantee suffic i e n t
revenue in the future to finance these costs. In an
effort to maintain fiscal sustainability, the IMF
advocates low, single-digit fiscal deficits, and in some
cases balanced budgets (zero deficit levels) or even
budget surpluses. Placing a ceiling on the wage bill
then helps government to meet this fiscal target. The
fear is that without a sufficiently low ceiling,
government will hire more employees than it can afford
to finance in the future. As a result, the government will
be forced to direct more resources to cover wages,
and will be have to spend into deficit to finance other
expenditures. The targeted fiscal balances (after
grants) for the three countries in our study are: Malawi
0.4% of GDP (IMF 2006b); Mozambique 4.5% and
Sierra Leone 2.7% (IMF 2006).17 18 
If government wants to hire more teachers, it must
look at ways in which it can increase fiscal space
without jeopardising fiscal sustainability. Government
can increase fiscal space to finance greater
investments in four ways. We discuss these below,
particularly asking whether they can provide the
fiscal space that is necessary to hire more teachers,
and whether it is appropriate to do so. 
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16 In making proposals for the upscaling of fiscal space, we are not ignoring the issue of Dutch disease. The occurrence and extent of Dutch disease is
determined by a number of factors, including the absorptive capacity of the economy to accommodate additional financial inflows and the way in which
inflows are utilised. The IEO (2007) report says that the IMF does not consistently assess the absorptive capacity space of low-income countries.
Further, as we have argued in section 1, education is a necessary input to productive sectors and therefore additional expenditures on education should
boost medium-term productive activity, at least within 7-10 years, if the influence on agricultural modernisations (discussed in section 1.2) is considered.
It is therefore reasonable to expect that there will be some scope for scaling up expenditures without triggering Dutch disease. This is something that
must be calculated on a country-by-country basis.
17 There are a number of different definitions used to describe the fiscal deficit. The ‘overall fiscal deficit’ is the difference between revenues and
expenditures. If this is measured excluding grants, the only revenues that are included are domestic revenues. If it is measured including grants, grant
aid is included as part of revenues, and the resulting fiscal deficit will therefore be smaller. We have generally used the latter, as governments tend to
increase their spending to match inflows of extra donor aid, and therefore to exclude grants in the measure of revenues misrepresents the excess in
government spending compared to revenues. The ‘primary fiscal balance’ refers to the difference between total domestic revenues and total spending,
excluding interest payments and external finance capital expenditure. This provides a measure of how much of a government’s programmed
expenditure is covered by domestic revenues.
18 A survey of IMF lending in 20 countries by Oxfam International showed that 15 out of the 20 countries had declining fiscal deficit targets over the three
years of IMF programmes. The average reduction was around 2% of GDP.
1. Reprioritising spending within existing
budgets
There are of course gains to be made in cutting
expenditure in non-priority sectors, such as defence,
to finance education. For instance, reducing the size
of the military would make space on the wage bill for
government to hire more teachers. In endorsing the
MDGs, the IMF has encouraged such reprioritisation
of funds towards education and health. But herein
lies the danger: while there may be some room to
make reallocations within the budget by diverting
funds from a non-priority sector or by making
efficiency savings, the amount liberated may be
small. Governments also have a broad range of
commitments – some for sound economic or social
reasons, others for political reasons – but these are
commitments nonetheless. Inevitably, the call to
reallocate resources results in countries with
restrictively small budgets is counter-productive and
detrimental for long-term development. For example,
a senior government official in Mozambique
confirmed that “…spending for education and health
will not decrease; in fact it might increase, even if
this means taking funds from agriculture.” Cutting
expenditure in agriculture or industry to finance
social sector investment may reduce the future
economic returns to education. Without agricultural
inputs or new job opportunities for both women and
men. So, although prioritising education is crucial,
sacrificing spending in other priority sectors is not a
worthwhile exchange. 
2. Looking for additional donor aid
In all three country studies we found great
expectation that donor aid would fill the funding gap,
providing the extra fiscal space needed to pay for
more teachers. For example, an IMF official speaking
of Mozambique told us: “If there is no scaling up [of
aid] I do not think Mozambique will reach the MDGs.
From our side we can do the [multilateral debt relief
initiative] MDRI, we can put more resources, cancel
debt19…We can encourage the government to better
tax the mega projects to have more resources
available for the MDGs but all that has to be done
while maintaining macroeconomic stability.” 
Based on past experiences, both the IMF and the
government expect donor aid to be unpredictable. 
If government uses donor funds to pay civil servants
salaries one year, but aid is not forthcoming the next,
then it will jeopardise fiscal sustainability. In response
government will have to either reduce salaries or lay
off public officials. As a result, governments are wary
of using donor funding to pay for recurrent
expenditures. In Mozambique, for example, though
donors cover 54% of the national budget through
direct budget support, government does not want 
to encourage the use of this aid to cover public 
sector salaries.2 0 This hesitancy, however, is entirely
dependant on the lack of reliability of donor aid
disbursements. In Section 4 we explore how
predictable donor aid that is offered over the long
term (10 years) could contribute to supporting GDP
growth and provide countries with greater domestic
resources to spend on salaries without creating
unnecessary long-term dependence on donor aid.
The provision of aid by donors, however, does not
mean that it can be spent. The macroeconomic
framework dictates how much of any additional
resources received can be spent, and the IMF plays a
vetting role in making donor-funding projections. The
IEO report (2007) criticises the IMF for consistent
pessimism in predicting donor aid flows. Empirical
analysis carried out for the evaluation suggests that
PRGF aid projections for sub-Saharan Africa were
typically slightly optimistic for the programme year and
s i g n i ficantly pessimistic for the outer years. In particular,
IMF aid projections for the region have not changed
much in the post-Gleneagles period, when donors at
the G8 meetings in 2005 “…agreed to double aid to
Africa by 2010…at least $25 billion extra per year for
A f r i c a .” A review of 30 IMF programmes and reviews
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19 Debt relief has proven to be disappointingly small. The government of Mozambique recognises that “from a budgetary standpoint, debt forgiveness
programs will not have a considerable impact in either the short or medium term” (Republic of Mozambique 2006a, p 42). In 2006/7 the combined
resources for Malawi from the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) and multilateral debt relief initiatives were MK (Malawian Kwacha) 8.6 billion – that
is 6.5% of revenues and 6.3% of expenditures. However, Malawi continues to be swamped by its domestic debt repayments, which are MK 13.8
billion, compared to MK1.9 billion for foreign debt repayments. In Sierra Leone, HIPC decision-point resources did go towards education, but recent
debt relief is being allocated towards power generation and infrastructure.
20 However, aid given to specific government programmes or projects often includes salary expenses for those officials involved. As a result, donor aid




Not spending the aid: shocking findings from the new IEO report 
An evaluation of the IMF and aid to sub-Saharan Africa
In March 2007 the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office issued a report criticising the role of the IMF in managing
aid inflows and determining the external resource envelope in 29 low-income countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa between 1999 and 2005. Disappointingly, it did not question the assumptions on which the
policies are advocated, leaving little room to discuss alternative policies. Nor did it recommend any radical shake-
up of the institution or a change in the IMF’s role in low-income countries. Overall it found that the IMF has
“…done little to address poverty reduction and income distributional issues, despite institutional rhetoric to the
contrary.” The report’s other findings include:
n The inflation rate continues to be the main determinate of how much aid government can spend. Countries
with inflation rates higher than 5% can spend only 15% of anticipated aid increases, while those with inflation
rates lower than 5% are ‘allowed’ to spend 79% of such increases. Siphoning aid resources into reserves
does not support efforts to alleviate poverty and strengthen education or health sectors.
n Ceilings on wage bills have undermined countries’ capacity to absorb additional aid flows for hiring teachers
and health workers. PRGF ceilings prioritise macro-focused goals over pro-poor concerns. They are not
necessarily the best solution, and unintended consequences can include limiting a country’s ability to absorb
and spend unanticipated aid inflows for hiring teachers and nurses and decrease in benefits and allowances. 
n The IMF has not only not been proactive in mobilising aid flows, but has tampered with expectations by
setting low projections, which influences the amount of aid provided and has forced governments to adopt
less ambitious plans to reduce poverty. It has also failed to set ambitious targets or identify additional aid
opportunities where such absorptive capacity exceeds projected aid flows. 
n While the IMF is mandated to take poverty and social impact assessments (PSIAs) into consideration when
formulating macroeconomic policy, this is not systematically done. “PSIAs carried out by World Bank staff,
DFID, and other agencies have not systematically informed PRGF program design…most PSIAs prepared by
other agencies generally lacked the necessary timeliness, relevance, and/or quality to underpin PRGF design.”
n The lack of coherence between the IMF and the World Bank is striking. “PRGF attention to aid absorptive
capacity constraints in education, health, or infrastructure, where the Bank is the lead agency, were rare, as
was the integration of the individual dimensions into an overall assessment that takes account of synergies and
tradeoffs across individual dimensions.”
n A lack of policy coherence within the IMF means that it continues to focus on macroeconomic stability, even if
it claims to have taken on poverty reduction strategies. Government officials note a shift in the IMF’s
management style, but there continues to be no discussion of alternative macroeconomic policies. 
n The IMF has missed opportunities to engage with civil society and in so doing has undermined its own goal of
enabling greater country ownership of macroeconomic policies.
These criticisms come at a time when the IMF faces a crisis of legitimacy as its middle-income borrowers have
disengaged and some sub-Saharan African countries no longer require their loans. Nigeria, Cape Verde, Uganda,
Ghana and Tanzania have replaced their previous PRGF arrangement with the new policy support instrument
(PSI), which does not include a loan arrangement. Mozambique also expects to shift to the PSI in 2007. However,
the IMF maintains a strong influence over monetary and fiscal policies under the PSI.
The findings of the IEO report expose the IMF’s power to shift donor aid intended for the social sectors towards
measures to maintain macroeconomic stability. The IMF can indeed be held to account for the international
community’s failure to provide the resources needed for education and health. Although the IMF claims to
endorse the MDGs, these findings indicate that it is not convinced of the value of investing in education and
health for economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
in sub-Saharan Africa that were completed in the
post-Gleneagles period, showed that only four were
more optimistic about foreseeing donor aid increases
(Goldsbrough and Elberger 2007). These conservative
projections encourage countries to make less ambitious
plans for spending because they anticipate less money.
This can lead to a destructive self-reinforcing dynamic:
if the IMF projects less income, then government plans
are less ambitious, and consequently donors see little
need for scaling up aid. Thus the IMF is creating a no-
win situation that is at odds with the commitments for
scaling up aid to meet the MDGs. 
Further, maintaining macroeconomic stability as
d e fined by the IMF results in the use of restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies that constrain overall
government spending. Attempting to meet single-digit
i n flation rates means that government cannot spend
much of the aid it receives for fear that this will result in
higher inflation rates. Countries classed as weak
economic performers are therefore required to siphon
the vast majority of aid into reserves. The evidence
presented by the IEO 2007 report (see Box 2)
demonstrates a disturbing switch point – a threshold
that polarises countries into those that are allowed to
spend and those that are not. Of the 29 sub-Saharan
countries in the study, those with inflation above the
5% threshold were allowed to spend only 15% of
increases in aid (IEO 2007): the remaining 85% of the
aid had to be placed in reserves or used to service
domestic debt. This might be acceptable if there was a
well-accepted justification for keeping inflation at or
below 5%; however, as demonstrated above, this is
not the case. In 2006, DFID made a 10-year pledge for
education in Mozambique. If our study countries are
unable to meet their inflation target, will these funds be
diverted into reserves rather than being spent on the
originally intended purpose? Will the shortage of
teachers in Mozambique get worse because it is forced
to stick to a highly debated monetary policy? Such an
outcome flies in the face of the stated goals of enabling
a scaling-up of spending to achieve the MDGs. 
3. Increasing domestic revenue
“In order to create fiscal space for poverty reduction,
Sierra Leone authorities will need to increase
domestic revenue-to-GDP ratio and rationalise
public expenditure.” (IMF 2007a)21
There are two ways government can expect to
increase domestic revenue: one is to grow faster;
the second is to increase tax collection as growth
expands jobs and profits in the private sector.
However, additional tax revenue through private
sector growth is not guaranteed and countries may
not automatically see the increases in tax revenues
they expect. The initial tax base in Malawi,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone, like most low-
income countries, is extremely small – so much so
that even good improvements will fall short of
government’s spending needs (McKinley 2005). A
Ministry of Finance official from Malawi told us that
“The private sector is so under-developed here, it
simply cannot provide the growth that is hoped for in
the medium term.” The high degree of informality
makes it much harder to collect taxes and
undermines the effectiveness of tax instruments to
increase government revenue (Stiglitz and Emran
2004). 
It is therefore naïve to encourage these countries to
rely on the domestic tax base, reduce aid
dependence on aid and – in the case of Sierra
Leone and Malawi – aim for a budget surplus
(Government of Malawi 2005). Without a careful
analysis of the differential impact of tax structures
and the private sector’s real capacity for growth,




21 Text appears on page 1 of IMF Press Release number 06/285, December 18, 2006  attached to Article IV consultation.
4. Increased borrowing: is it appropriate
for government to borrow to meet its
development goals?
“Living on our own resources won’t work. The
government should not be scared to borrow if it
knows what the money is going on and it is
accountable.” Member of Parliament, government of
Malawi. 
The IMF has made it a priority to limit government
borrowing in order to reduce debt payments and
prevent the ‘crowding out’ of the private sector.
When a government borrows from its own domestic
economy, this can reduce the amount of resources
available for borrowing by private sector investors.
On the other hand, to attract more savings and
make up for what is lost through government
borrowing, the interest rate for savings must rise.
This makes investment more expensive for the
private sector, thus discouraging the private
investment that is needed to stimulate economic
growth. This is known as the ‘crowding-out’ of
private sector investment. 
However, there is an equally compelling argument
that government spending can have a ‘crowding-in’
effect. Government spending can provide a signal to
the private sector that it is worthwhile investing in an
area, especially where the government provides
goods and services that are necessary inputs to
private sector production (Cardim de Carvalho
1994). For example, public investment in education
and health contributes to building a better-educated
and healthier work force. Access to skilled labour is
an incentive for domestic and foreign businesses to
invest. Government expenditure on health and
education could therefore be classed as
‘investment’ (McKinley 2004; Pasha and Palanivel
2004). Nevertheless, spending on wages for
teachers, doctors and nurses is currently classed as
government ’consumption’ – the PRGF macro
projections had not considered expenditure on
health or education as government ‘investment’ in
any of the three countries studied. 
The IMF does recognise that education can
contribute to growth and has conceded that
“…public investment can crowd-in private
investment in Sub-Saharan African countries
[reflecting] the complementarity of private
investments with some components of pubic
investment” (Gupta et al 2006, p 26). 
However, the IMF approach to borrowing has not
fundamentally changed as a result of these new
insights. In Mozambique, the IMF continues to
discourage government from borrowing to finance
greater public investment. The available credit to
government is expected to decrease from 2.4% of
GDP in 2006 to 0.6% by the end of 2007 (IMF
2006a).22 The government of Malawi feels that the
IMF is being far more flexible in its approach. One
Ministry of Finance official stated that “If the IMF has
learned anything over the last few years, it is to
listen!” The fact that the IMF acquiesced to a mid-
year change in the budget allocations to
accommodate a large agriculture subsidy (2.4% of
GDP) in 2005/6 is seen by the government as
evidence of this change. However, the macro
framework is still aiming for a reduction in the fiscal
deficit to 0% of GDP by 2008/9 (IMF 2006b). As
stated in the IMF’s second review of Malawi’s PRGF
(IMF 2006b) “Reducing the domestic debt burden
will remain the cornerstone of the fiscal strategy.
This will be attained by expenditure restraint.” This
restrictive fiscal policy continues even after research
from the IMF has indicated that there is no
relationship between low fiscal deficit rates and
growth in a low-income country that has already
achieved macroeconomic stability (Baldacci et al
2004). Malawi, Sierra Leone and Mozambique have
all achieved macroeconomic stability, and yet the
IMF continues to encourage the same fiscal policies
it used when it feared government spending was out
of control.
There are of course legitimate fears that lead the IMF
to push governments to avoid excessive deficits. If
governments borrow money to finance core public
page
18
22 The net credit to government target measures the amount of borrowing a government can undertake to cover the funding gap that remains once all aid
funds available to government have been used. In Mozambique, the IMF has shifted from using the primary fiscal deficit target to the net credit to
government target to determine the level of government borrowing.
expenditure, the borrowing is likely to continue year
on year, and the cost of interest payments will
undermine future government spending. For
example, in the mid-1990s, Malawi was using up 
to 40% of its recurrent budget to finance debt
repayments. Without a guarantee of GDP growth in
the future, this debt may become impossible for
government to pay back. This explains the IMF
focus on deficit reduction; however, not all
government borrowing inevitably leads to escalating
government debt.
A primary reason for this scepticism towards
government borrowing is that the IMF lacks the
capacity to project over the long term and so
cannot assess the positive development paybacks
to investing in education over a 10-to-15-year period
(Roy et al 2006). The IMF macroeconomic model is
a short-term one spanning a three-to-five-year
period used to assess fiscal sustainability. However,
economic returns to education that would allow for
higher GDP growth rates and an expansion of fiscal
space may only become apparent over a 7-to-15-
year period. As a result, the present IMF model
cannot analyse the economic returns that could
accrue from present investments that require higher
deficit spending in the short-to-medium term.
Without the capacity to project long-term returns to
investment, it is unable to accurately assess fiscal
sustainability. Because the IMF is either unwilling or
unable to undertake this sort of analysis, it maintains
that deficit spending is never appropriate: it affirms
that investment in education will help to stimulate
economic growth in the long term, but fails to factor
this into its calculations when it matters. 
Irresponsible borrowing should not be encouraged.
However, to remove borrowing altogether from the
set of policy options available to responsible
governments is as problematic as promoting
mindless borrowing itself. 
Some of the IMF’s advice is good, as far as it goes.
It encourages the reprioritisation of spending
towards education and an increase in domestic
revenue through more tax collection. However, it
recognises that these measures alone will not
provide the fiscal space necessary for greater
investments in education and to meet the MDGs
more generally. Therefore, it calls for more
predictable donor aid to finance these expenditures. 
While all of this is uncontroversial, it is undermined
by the IMF’s power to insist on single-digit inflation
rates and low or zero deficits, which prevent
governments from expanding the overall envelope
for public sector spending, either through the use of
aid or through sensible government borrowing. 
The IMF should desist from setting economic policy
conditions, leaving the way open for governments to
evaluate the evidence on inflation and decide what
level is correct for them, in order to expand fiscal
space by scaling up aid and to contemplate sensible
borrowing that does not jeopardise fiscal
sustainability.
At the moment, despite the availability of evidence
and experience from other countries, the
governments of our three case study countries
effectively have little choice other than to follow the
IMF’s definition of stability and reduce inflation and
deficits to arbitrarily low levels. Nor do poor people
have a say in any of our case study countries;
neither parliamentarians nor civil society are involved
in the negotiations between the MoF and the IMF in
which the macro targets are determined. Countries
have the right to explore other development paths,
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3.1 Impact in Malawi, Mozambique
and Sierra Leone 
“It is the ceiling that dictates how many more
teachers we can hire, not need. Schools tell us how
many more teachers they need, but we are rarely
able to meet this request,” Senior official at Ministry
of Education, Sierra Leone.
Under the current wage bill ceilings, it will be
impossible for Malawi, Mozambique or Sierra Leone
to hire the number of teachers they require to ensure
children learn in class sizes of less than 40. Table 2
shows the impact of the ceiling on the wage bill in
Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone correlating
the ceilings with the current number of teachers and
the number required to meet the 2015 goal of
universal primary completion (UPC). 
Wage bill ceilings that prevent governments from
hiring more teachers, including female teachers,
lead to overcrowded classrooms with high PTRs,
which in turn lead to poor learning outcomes. The
World Bank recently acknowledged an urgent need
to focus on improving learning outcomes, but this
is impossible with insufficient trained teachers and
unmanageable class sizes (Independent Evaluation
Group 2006). Although the end result is that both
girls and boys will drop out, prejudices against
educating girls mean that they are less likely than
boys to complete primary school (see Table 1,
page 6). Therefore, placing a wage bill ceiling
without considering the number of teachers
needed has a different impact on girls and boys.
This is particularly true in the absence of female
teachers, and creates a vicious cycle where girls




The impact of IMF policies on education
Table 2 
The Impact of wage ceilings in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, 2007
Country Current Current Current Number of Ceiling on % of wage Teacher Is there a
number of pupil- number of teachers needed the public bill going wage bill specific cap 
teachers teacher untrained to achieve UPC sector wage to teachers’ as % of on number
(female/ ratio (para) by 2015 at PTR bill (as % salaries 2007 GDP of teachers
male %) teachers 40:1 (includes of GDP) that can
rates of attrition)* be hired?
Malawi 45,268 72:1 0 90,477 7% 37% 2.7% No
M o z a m b i q u e 47,193 74:1 38% 109,172 7.5% 35% 2.7% No
31% f 
69% m
Sierra Leone 18,038 57:1 40% 28,895 6.1% 35% 4.5% ceiling of







* see Annex 2 for detailed calculations
Malawi: Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, National Education Strategic Plan (Nov 2006 draft).
Mozambique: Ministry of Education and Culture, Education Database 2007. 
Sierra Leone: all data from Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a and Republic of Sierra Leone 2006c.
enable them to improve their lives and contribute to
economic development.
All three countries have made it a national priority to
retain more girls in school, recognising that when the
learning environment is not conducive, girls tend to
perform less well than boys. Having female teachers
in school would encourage more girls to enrol in,
and complete, primary school. Some countries are
pursuing policies to recruit more female teachers –
Mozambique, for example, promotes positive
discrimination policies for female candidates at
teacher training institutions. But such targeted
interventions struggle to make an impact when set
against the wider picture of constraints on overall
teacher numbers. This creates a vicious cycle: the
lack of female teachers means fewer girls attend and
succeed in school; and because fewer girls graduate
to higher levels, fewer women enter teacher training.
As a senior official in Sierra Leone’s Ministry of
Education explained: “The low number of teachers is
problematic and contradictory to efforts to provide
subsidies for girls transitioning to secondary school,
because research shows the importance of female
teachers in maintaining attendance and success
rates in school. There is a correlation between the
low enrolment of female students in secondary
school and in math, science and polytechnic
universities and the low number of female teachers
at these levels”.
Breaking this cycle means investing not only in
teachers but also in promoting girls’ education – for
example, in discrimination and gender bias training
to ensure teachers emulate values and principles of
equality, justice and equal opportunity in the
classroom. All this requires long-term investment:
wage bill ceilings pose an unfortunate hurdle to
tackling gender disparities in education. 
The disastrous impact of wage bill ceilings on
teacher numbers, quality and planning processes is
illustrated in our three case countries:
Sierra Leone
The assumptions that guide the wage bill ceiling and
the inevitable caps on teacher numbers that follow
create obstacles for long-term planning and building of
human capacity. Once the cap level is set by the MoF,
the Ministry of Education has to distribute teacher
ceilings per school, determining how many teachers
are required for any given school. These numbers are
based on a target PTR, enrolment figures, number of
classrooms/schools and the number of teachers on
study leave. Because of the low ceiling and the cap on
the number of additional teachers that can be hired, the
ministry has established a target PTR at 50:1, far above
the EFA-FTI’s recommended 40:1. Setting a generic
PTR means that the unique needs of different schools
and schooling levels are not considered – for example,
at primary level, one teacher teaches all subjects, but at
secondary level, you need a different teacher for each
specialised subject, which means a greater number of
teachers overall. 
Placing a cap on additional teachers also places a
ceiling on the total enrolment figure and number of
schools that can be built in each district. Sierra
Leone’s largest education project, Sababu, aims to
construct more schools, but the caps mean that many
of these now have an inadequate number of teachers,
and in 2007 the government decided to slow down
construction. To prevent over-flooding 
in the limited number of classrooms, the MEST has set
a ceiling on the maximum enrolment for each school,
which means children are turned away. Nevertheless,
the need for schools and teachers continues to grow,
as does the out-of-school population. 
The consequences of wage ceilings are so severe in
Sierra Leone that the new 10-year Education Sector
Plan makes several observations on the impact of
stringent macroeconomic policies on education,
particularly in increasing the already high PTR: 
“The country average is 66 pupils to a teacher and
112 pupils per qualified teacher. There is an obvious
need to hire more qualified teachers, but a ceiling on
teacher employment made necessary by MoF/IMF
requirements has made that impossible. Further,
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keeping to our commitment of free quality education
as stated in the 2004 Education Act and meeting
EFA-FTI benchmarks whilst at the same time keeping
to teacher ceiling requirements which appear to take
no cognisance of these facts places Sierra Leone in a
very difficult position. The foregoing being the case,
in setting the level of wage bill cap/reduction,
reference must be made to the expenditures required
to meet the MDGs and EFA goals in order to ensure
that macroeconomic policies are not counter-
productive to the realisation of these goals” (Republic
of Sierra Leone 2007a, p 23).
Not surprisingly, the wage bill caps undermine current
efforts to reform the civil service and adequately plan
throughout the year, never mind in the long term.
For example, the Ministry of Education in Sierra
Leone is informed of the ceiling/cap on teachers at
the beginning of the financial year in January. It then
has to project and distribute teachers across schools
based on this cap. However, as the school year begins
in September, the ministry must estimate how many
teachers can be hired on current need and how many
spaces to keep open for September – the start of the
school year. Those schools that do not get the total
number of teachers they require must wait five months
until the new fiscal year in January to get new teachers. 
Malawi
In 1998 the government of Malawi began to use the
wage bill as a way of containing the budget – first by
limiting wage increases and then by imposing a
recruitment freeze, introduced in 2003. From 2004, the
new government brought with it a new level of
stringency in macroeconomic planning and it has used
the wage bill as a buffer to absorb other overruns in the
budget. For example, planned annual salary increases
were reduced and then delayed in 2005 and 2006 to
compensate for budget overruns in other areas. 
There continues to be a wage bill ceiling: a new
PRGF began in 2005, committing the government to
a ceiling of less than 8% (Government of Malawi
2005a). However, it has consistently been below this
level: 7.4% for 2005/6 (IMF 2006b), 7.2% for
2006/7, and it is set to remain at the same level over
the medium term. One MoF official stated, “The 7%
rule is a rule for ordinary times, but these are not
ordinary times.” No new teachers have been trained
in the last 10 years,23 so demand for recruitment has
been limited. And while there is now a plan to
expand pre-service training capacity, the wage bill
ceiling is likely to limit the sector’s ability to recruit
the teachers that receive this training. Part and
parcel of the wage bill ceiling is a rule that line
ministries are only allowed to budget for filled posts.
As a result, 2,500 teachers will graduate in October
with no provision for their salaries in the new
financial year budget. Despite desperately high
PTRs, the government cannot budget for the
recruitment of teachers.
Although there is optimism in government that the
wage bill ceiling will be removed, this does not seem
to have been formally discussed or raised with the
IMF. However, the overall budget is limited to 39.5%
of GDP and can therefore only increase at 6% each
year – the anticipated rate of economic growth.
National priorities have recently changed and
Malawi’s Growth and Development Strategy places 
a growing emphasis on infrastructure development
projects, while the development budget is gradually
increasing at the expense of the recurrent budget.
Accordingly there is little reason to believe that the
wage bill will be able to grow in real terms over the
coming years: even if the cap is removed, the limits
on the overall budget size mean that the wage bill is
still effectively constrained. All of Malawi’s existing
43,000 teachers are officially qualified; however, 51%
of them have only received six weeks of in-service
training as part of a one-year reduced training
programme. The quality of this programme has been
questioned, leading to major changes in the proposed
service training programme for future years.
Mozambique
In 2005, the government set the wage bill at 6.5% of
GDP (Republic of Mozambique 2005b). By the end
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23 One reason for this is that most funding earmarked for training was diverted to provide basic training to teachers recruited after the abolition of user fees
in 1994.
of that year, it reported that it had failed to meet this
indicative target because it continued to hire
contract teachers to meet the demand for primary
education. At the same time, it indicated that it could
not meet the indicative target set in the PRGF
arrangement and follow through on its promise to
provide free quality primary education to all. In 2005,
the government was finally able to meet its indicative
target. The wage bill decreased to 6.7% of GDP
(Republic of Mozambique 2005). Despite the
expansion of primary education, the Ministry of
Education was only allowed to hire 4,715 teachers
of the 11,500 requested in 2005, and the PTR rose
to 74:1 (PAP 2006). 
Donors alarmed by the rising PTR acknowledged that
“…the quality of education is being affected because
funds are not sufficient to hire teachers in the required
quantity and with adequate training” (PAP 2006).
Donors’ emphasis on the need for quality education
put additional pressure on government and the IMF to
reconsider the wage bill ceiling as an indicative target.
In 2006, working together, donors and the Ministry of
Education succeeded in getting the wage bill ceiling
increased from 6.5% to 7.5%of GDP, allowing the
Ministry of Education to hire an additional 10,137
employees, 9,000 of whom are new primary and
secondary teachers. This is an example to other
countries: it shows that where concerted efforts are
made to challenge the wage bill ceiling, signific a n t
progress can be made. 
The unrealistic cap on teachers in Sierra Leone and
the low level of the wage bill ceilings in Malawi and
Mozambique are placing increasing pressures on the
education system. Yet the impact of IMF policies in
starving the public sector of workers is not restricted to
these three countries. All countries with an IMF loan
arrangement implement similar monetary and fis c a l
policies to those described above. Six also have a
s p e c i fic wage bill ceiling included as a performance
criterion in their PRGF arrangement. The legitimacy of
these caps is rarely questioned by those working in
the education sector, but the example of Mozambique
is one that could be followed in many other contexts. 
3.2 Global impact 
“IMF program design has paid almost no systematic
attention to the [millennium development] Goals when
considering a country’s budget or macroeconomic
framework. In the vast number of country programs
supported by the IMF since the adoption of the Goals
there has been almost no discussion about whether
the strategies are consistent with achieving them” 
(UN Millennium Project 2005, p 93).
A recent IMF working paper (Fedelino et al 2006)
acknowledges that between 2003 and 2005, the IMF
imposed some conditionality on the public sector
wage bill in half of the 42 countries with PRGF-
supported arrangements; 17 of these faced
quantitative ceilings on the wage bill, and for eight the
ceiling was a ‘hard’ condition, a performance criterion
that could cause an interruption in the IMF programme
if breached. As of May 2006, the number of countries
with wage ceilings as performance criteria was six.
Conditionality was concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa
and Central America: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Zambia, Nepal, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Dominica, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua. In
reality, many more countries face limits on the
number of teachers they can hire as a result of wider
macroeconomic policies negotiated with the IMF. 
The pursuit of single-digit inflation rates and low fis c a l
d e ficit levels in all countries with a PRGF arrangement
means that many more face limits on their wage bill, as
a result of overall budget ceilings. Table 3 includes all
17 countries, as well as others that do not have explicit
conditionalities on their wage bill, but where overall
budget ceilings have led the government to limit
teacher recruitment or cap the number of teachers
they can hire. None of the countries included in the
table have achieved universal primary education. Most
have PTR above the recommended 40:1 benchmark
and more girls out of school than boys. 
The fact that these targets are so similar despite the
different country contexts serves to highlight how little
a country’s real social and economic problems inform
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its macroeconomic policies. Most of the countries in
this table are presently under-spending on education,
allocating less than the 6% of GNP recommended by
Delors’ UNESCO report (1996). Certainly they are not
spending excessively or disproportionately. But they
cannot realistically increase their spending to
recommended levels without employing more
teachers (who make up the bulk of any education
budget). With these wage bill ceilings in place, it will
be difficult to increase spending to hire the number of
teachers needed to meet the 2015 goals. 
In K e n y a, for example, the government implemented
free primary education in 2003. Enrolment rates soared
from 5.8 million in 2002 to 7.1 million in 2004 (Republic
of Kenya  2005). However, the cap on teachers agreed
upon by the IMF and the Ministry of Finance in 1997
prevents the Ministry of Education from hiring more
than 235,000 teachers. As a result the PTR, which in
2002 was 34:1, jumped to 41:1  by 2004. It is
expected to increase as enrolment rates continue to
increase with population growth (Republic of Kenya
2005a). In rural schools the PTR reached excessive
levels. Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge that
existing teachers, police and other civil servants did
receive significant pay awards in this period.
In Uganda the Ministry of Finance capped the total
number of teachers at 127,000 (Republic of Uganda
2006). Unlike Kenya, the wage bill ceiling is not included
in Uganda’s new PSI as either an indicative target or a
performance criterion. However, targeting inflation at 4%
has implications for how much the government can
spend on wages (IMF2007b). As a result, it cannot
afford to hire the 176,000 teachers needed to achieve
universal primary education and the PTR is expected
to remain high at 50:1 (Republic of Uganda 2005).
Cutting expenditure on education also has implications
for teacher recruitment and training in the medium
term. In C a m e r o o n, measures to cut back investment
in education in 1990 led to the closing down of teacher
training colleges (World Bank 1997). It was estimated
that, by the time these colleges reopened in 1996, as
many as 15,000 teachers needed to be trained to
cope with rising enrolment rates. It is now estimated




IMF policies and health sector workers
In 2006 Wemos explored how Ghana, Kenya, Uganda
and Zambia could finance a massive expansion in
health services if the IMF’s PRGF programmes and
policy advice did not constrain these same
governments from raising their budget ceilings. Not
surprisingly, the findings highlighted the same paradox
in the IMF’s flawed logic. “The IMF argues that wage
spending must be cut to create resources to spend on
fighting poverty. However, one of the most effective
means to fight poverty is to employ more health
workers, but they cannot be employed because IMF
wage ceilings inadvertently restrict the hiring of health
p r o f e s s i o n a l s .” Wemos rejected the IMF’s argument
that higher wage spending would lead to inflation and
erode macroeconomic goals. 
In Ghana for example, the most important constraint in
the health sector was found to be the lack of adequate
numbers of the right type of worker, in the right places
and with appropriate training. The doctor-population
ratio is 1:17,617 and the nurse-population ratio is
1:1,513. Reducing the maternal mortality rate from the
current 210 per 1,000 live births to 54 per 100,000 by
2015 is extremely challenging. Nevertheless, given its
dependence on the IMF, the government of Ghana
agreed to cut back the wage bill in 2005 from 9 to 8.5%
of GDP. New health staff could not be employed, nor
wages and allowances increased, without prior
approval of the MoF. Although the IMF finally agreed to
issue a waiver on Ghana’s overrun, the ceiling
nevertheless led to suspension of additional duty hours
allowances and the government could not honour in full
a wage agreement with registered nurses. 
Overall the report highlighted the need to calculate
wage bills on a country-by-country basis, taking into
consideration staffing levels, appropriate wage rates
and the government’s capacity (including aid
resources) to finance wage spending over the
medium to long term. These should be determined by
the MoF in consultation with each ministry.
2015 to attain the MDG and EFA goals. Given this past
history and the urgent need to substantially increase





Impact of macroeconomic polices on teachers worldwide
Country Number of Pupil- Number of Education Wage bill Cap on Inflation Fiscal 
out of school teacher teachers needed budget as ceiling as teachers rate balance 
children / ratio to achieve UPC % of % of GDP target after 
(girls) in 1,000s by 2015 (includes GNP grants 
attrition rates)** target 
Malawi 89 (19) 72:1 90,477 6.2% 7.2% - 7.4% -0.4%
M o z a m b i q ue# 1,089 (614) 74:1 109,172 5% (GDP) 7.5% - 6% -4.5%
Sierra Leone **** 57:1 28,895 4.9% (GDP) 6.1% 33,122 9.3 % -2.7%
Azerbaijan 101(51) 14:1 - 3.7% 8.3% - 5% 1.8%
Bangladesh# 404 (51) 55:1 397,900 2.1% 2.5% - 5.2% 3.5%***
Benin 220 (176.3) 62:1 48,800 3.3% 5.5% - 2.5% -2.7%
Burkina Faso 1,271 (681) 49:1 83,500 2.4% (GDP) 4.7% - 3.1% -5.8%
Burundi 518 (278) 51:1 47,900 5.3% 12% 3,000 4% 0.7%
(in 2007) 
Cameroon# - 54:1 69,100 4% 4.8% - 1.9% 0.6%
Chad 657 (243) 69:1 67,800 2% 6.5% - 7.9% -1.5%
Dominica 0.7 (0.4) 19:1 - 5.5% 12.2% - 1.5% 0.7%
DRC - - - - - - - -
Ghana 1,129 (557) 33:1 96,200 * - 8.9% - 7.1% -5.2% 
Guyana - 27:1 1,300 5.8% - - 3.5% -4.4%
Honduras 70 (27) 33:1 26,000 4.2% 9.6% - 5% -2.1%
Kenya 1,226 (607) 43:1 161,700 7.1% 6.6% 235,000 5% -1.5% 
Mali 1172 (615) 55:1 89,000 3% 4.8% - 2.5% -3.7%
Nepal 698 (434) 40:1 81,200 3.4% - - 6% -3.1%
Nicaragua 124 (62) 35:1 18,400 3.2% 6.7% - 6.2% -1.3%
Niger 1,326 (717) 44:1 91,400 2.3% - - 2% -5.8%
Pakistan# 6,463 (4,204) 37:1 536,400 2% - - 6.5% -3.6% 
Senegal 616 (320) 54:1 55,200 4.1% 5.7% - 1.7% -3.4%
Tajikistan 20 (17) 22:1 - 4% ( G D P ) 4.5% - 5% -0.5% 
Uganda# - 50:1 176,000 5.3% 5% 127,000 4% -2.2%
Zambia 435 (214) 49:1 61,200 2.9% 7.9% - 5% -2%
Sources: UNESCO (2006 and 2006a); on IMF caps: Fedelino et al (2006); most recent IMF loan arrangement www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm
# countries that no longer have a ceiling in IMF programmes 
* There is some discrepancy in this figure: the UN Millennium Project has projected the 2010 teacher shortage in Ghana to be 134,694
** Data for Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone from tables in Annex 2
*** Overall balance excluding grant 
* **** Data from 2007 Education Sector Plan shows 30% of children of primary school going age are out of school
No data is available for DRC and other areas where figures were not available.
4.1 Greater flexibility by the IMF?
As noted in the introduction, we chose Mozambique,
Malawi and Sierra Leone as case studies because
the IMF claims to have shown some flexibility in all
these countries. In Mozambique, the wage bill 
ceiling was expanded by 1% of GDP specifically so
the government could hire more teachers. The
government of Sierra Leone has been granted annual
‘top-ups’ for hiring more teachers. In Malawi, the
education sector was exempted from the recruitment
freeze and an automatic adjuster was added to the
ceiling to allow the payment of salary top-ups for
health sector workers and to hire more health sector
workers if additional donor financing became
available through the Sector Wide framework.
Undoubtedly, these were steps in the right direction
and enabled governments to make some progress
in hiring more teachers. However, our research also
showed that the IMF needs to move further and
faster to allow governments to reclaim control over
hiring decisions.
Malawi
In Malawi, the IMF is showing flexibility in two ways.
First, when the Ministry of Health successfully made
the case for expanding the wage bill ceiling to hire
more health workers, the IMF proposed an adjuster in
the wage bill, allowing the salary top-ups provided by
DFID to be accommodated within the wage bill
ceiling. This adjuster means that the planned wage bill
ceiling for any one year will be adjusted – in other
words, it will rise or fall – in line with the variation in the
donor disbursements. The IMF resident representative
stated that the IMF proposed this adjuster, convinced
of the need to create incentives to reign in the cross-
border brain drain in health sector personnel. The
Ministry of Health developed a credible, long-term
plan for financing health and there was great
c o n fidence in the Ministry’s capacity to deliver it.
Accordingly, boosted by the introduction of the health
sector-wide plan, substantial backing came from
donors, who significantly increased resources to the
sector, constituting MK6.85bn for 2005/6 and
MK6.1bn in 2006/7 (Government of Malawi 2006a).
The extent of the IMF’s flexibility will could soon be
revealed as both the education and agricultural
sectors have expressed interest in pursing a similar
path as health. If these ministries were able to
present strong plans, making a good case for
expanding investment, having garnered the
resources to do so, would it not be reasonable to
replicate the flexibility shown to the health sector
and include adjusters for both education and
agriculture? 
All of this brings into question whether the wage bill
ceiling should continue at all. The IMF has noted that
omitting certain priority sectors from the wage bill
ceiling may not help to control a ballooning wage bill
(Fedelino et al 2006). However, as noted by senior
officials in the government of Malawi, the wage bill is
now largely under control. There is a general
expectation within the Ministry of Finance that the
wage bill ceiling set as a performance criterion will
be short-lived. Indeed, it was the IMF resident
representative who volunteered the information that
the wage bill cap would not be in place in one to two
years’ time. 
The situation in Malawi seems to be changing partly
because of the capacity of the Health Ministry to
develop a solid long-term plan for investment in
health workers but also because of increased donor
support which is designed to finance salaries.
Another reason which was cited by several officials
in the health, finance and education ministries was
that the MoF, now headed by the former IMF Africa
division chief, has a new, growing confidence and
technical ability and is capable of presenting




What needs to change?
Sierra Leone
The IMF has shown a willingness to issue waivers where
the wage bill ceiling has been breached in Sierra Leone.
Although the actual ceiling on the number of teachers
that can be hired is determined by the MoF, we learned
through several interviews that it is the IMF that
determines whether the Ministry of Education can be
granted a waiver to ‘top-up’ beyond the amount set
in the ceiling. For example, in 2007, the Ministry of
Education was able to hire 2,000 teachers in addition to
the 33,122 allowed for in the ceiling. However a senior
o f ficial from the MEST told us that even this adjustment
was inadequate, calling it “an embarrassment to the
MEST” that is not conducive to rational long-term
planning and generally undermines the government’s
efforts to provide free basic education. The new
Education Sector Plan echoes these concerns:
“The cap placed on the wage bill has to be expanded to
r e flect the real situation and need for increasing the
number of trained teachers and ensuring that untrained
teachers are able to access in-service training to
improve their skills. Unless the wage bill is expanded to
increase the adequate number of teachers required (not
just a nominal increase per year), the MDG/EFA goal of
universal primary education by 2015 will not be realised”
(Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a, p 23). 
While the IMF has recognised that Sierra Leone needs
more teachers and has provided annual ‘waivers’ to hire
a few thousand more teachers, this practice continues to
place the decision-making power squarely with the IMF
rather than the government. Whether or not hiring more
teachers is a good enough reason to justify an increase
in the wage bill ceiling should be a decision taken not by
the IMF but by elected governments. Moreover, the IMF
admits that “…once introduced, wage bill ceilings have
been there to stay” (Fedelino et al 2006, p 12). These
findings from the IMF itself indicate that there is little
room for flexibility within ceilings once they are included
in a country’s PRGF. If Sierra Leone continues to incur
overruns, could it be because the ceiling was set too low
in the first place and has not adequately factored in the
actual need for teachers? 
Mozambique
Under pressure from the donor community, the
wage bill ceiling was raised and is no longer an
indicative target in Mozambique’s agreement with
the IMF. As a result, we would expect the
government to be able to hire the number of
teachers it needs to ensure quality primary
education. However, MoF officials claim that
pressure to reduce the overall budget in order to
achieve single-digit inflation rates and low fiscal
deficit levels continue to limit the number of new
employees that can be added to the government
payroll. The MoF therefore continues to implement a
stringent wage bill ceiling even though it is no longer
strictly required to do so. As one government official
noted “…the government has removed the cap as
an indicative target. But really, the wage bill policy
has not changed considerably. In effect, the inflation
policy has become more rigid.” Given these policies
and the lack of long-term term predictable aid, the
Ministry of Education only expects to meet a 54:1
PTR by 2015.
Flexibility requires the government and IMF to listen
to alternative voices and explore different solutions.
However, we found little evidence of any debate
between the IMF and the MoF on possible ways to
increase fiscal space or allow for slightly higher
inflation rates. An IEO study of the IMF in
Mozambique concluded that there is little to no
discussion of alternative macroeconomic policies
with government, and no significant discussion of
such policy with civil society (IEO 2004).24 Although
the IMF has shown some flexibility in re-evaluating
the wage bill ceiling in Mozambique, the pressure to
reduce deficit spending even further means that the
current wage bill is likely to be maintained. 
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24 Historical comparison shows that policy space available for today’s developing countries is not the smallest it has ever been. However, policy space for
developing countries has been constantly shrinking over the last quarter of a century and is at the risk of shrinking even further, to the point of making
the use of any meaningful policy for economic development impossible (Chang 2005).
4.2 What more needs to change? 
“Whilst macroeconomic policy considerations such
as maintaining single digit inflation and low fiscal
deficit targets are important and determine the
amount of funds available for education, a
framework needs to be developed which would not
compromise important education targets and
impacts negatively on our fight against poverty in the
long-term” (Republic of Sierra Leone 2007a, p 23). 
It is encouraging that donors in these three countries
have shown a willingness to increase pooled
funding, budget support and other mechanisms that
can finance salary costs, and that the IMF, finally
recognising the need to hire more teachers and
health workers, has allowed some upward
adjustments to the wage bill. However, this much-
vaunted ‘flexibility’ is possible only within the very
tight parameters that the IMF allows for inflation and
deficits; and is not nearly enough to guarantee every
child a trained teacher in a class of 40 or less.
Before countries can use projected aid increases to
hire enough teachers, there must be more
fundamental changes to the IMF macroeconomic
framework and much faster progress towards
making all donor aid genuinely predictable and
adequate.
There are three key areas in which change is
needed. Because these areas are linked,
advancement in one necessitates reform in another. 
1. Needs-based macro planning: Overall,
macroeconomic policy should be a tool, not only
to ensure stability, but to enable the achievement
of national development and social goals. At
present, total government expenditure levels are
set after macroeconomic targets. Governments
are therefore forced to resort to ‘negotiating’ with
the IMF to accommodate minor changes or
additional programmes in the total expenditure
ceiling. We propose that governments consider
turning this process on its head, starting with a
long-term needs-based assessment of
expenditure requirements, in line with basic
rights, obligations and national goals for
eradicating poverty. This would enable
governments to identify suitable macroeconomic
targets to ensure macroeconomic stability, based
on their country’s individual needs rather than
arbitrary targets based on world averages. The
long-term returns of investment in education and
health should also be factored into these new
macro plans as should the disparities between
women and men.
2. Long-term aid: The next change needs to
come from donors: they need to provide the
long-term, predictable, sustained aid flows that
would enable countries to meet the MDG targets.
We have already seen the success of increased
aid in the health sector in Malawi. The same
principle should be applied to all social sectors.
Below we show how long-term aid can be made
compatible with growth in national resources
without making governments more dependent 
on aid.
3. Country-specific targets: Finally,
governments should be able to choose the right
mix of monetary and fiscal policies in order to
accommodate an increase in spending as a
result of increased aid where there is absorptive
capacity. This entails that the default switch point
in macroeconomic targets should be set aside,
allowing governments to draw upon a wide array
of sources and experiences, to explore the ’grey
areas’ in monetary and fiscal policies. This
flexibility would allow governments to consider
options and find a position which balances the
need to increase spending on social sectors with
the assurance of macroeconomic stability. A
wide array of stakeholders should be involved in
these discussions, including parliamentarians,





National development goals guide 
public investment 
Education and finance ministries must strive to
achieve more ambitious social targets based on
needs rather than the anticipated resource envelope.
We have developed alternative scenarios suggesting
how many teachers are required over the coming
years to achieve optimal PTR (see Annex 2). Our
projections are as follows:
n Sierra Leone: 28,895 teachers needed to
ensure quality education in primary schools
(about 10,000 more than present) 
n Malawi: 90,477 primary teachers will need to be
hired by 2015 to achieve the 40:1 PTR (almost
exactly double the present number) 
n Mozambique: 109,172 primary teachers are
needed (more than double the present number).
I n flation and fiscal deficit policies would be determined
from these or other teacher projections. This approach
need not lead to exaggerated inflation or deficit levels:
where levels exceed what is considered to be within a
reasonable range, the iterative process would begin,
with adjustments made to the expenditure target, until
a balanced position is found. This approach is based
on the assumption that the assessment of needs
and gender disparities – rather than arbitrary
macroeconomic target rates – should provide the
starting point. The UNDP, working on a MDG-based
macroeconomic framework, proposes that policies
should then be defined with the objective of meeting
these goals, which necessitate sustained long-term
investment, because changes in education, health and
gender inequalities take time (McKinley 2005, Roy et
al 2006). A long-term perspective is also valuable in
that it enables the economic returns to investment in
education to be factored into projections.
Solid, long-term national plans need to be the
foundation stone of this approach. The three countries
of our study have already attempted to develop long-
term national and education plans through a
participatory process, bringing together government
officials, intellectuals and civil society. Education is
recognised as a key investment to ensure long-term
economic and social development. However, in all
three cases, these long-term development plans lack
credibility and do not inform current macroeconomic
policy debates. In Mozambique, the poverty reduction
strategy paper (PRSP) guides the government’s
spending priorities and the PRGF lays out its
macroeconomic policies (Derenzio and Hanlon 2007).
Yet, the PRSP and the PRGF are only three-year
plans, and the social targets government has set for
itself are based on anticipated resources rather than
needs. Seeing as the macroeconomic framework
made explicit in the PRGF underpins the PRSP,
monetary and fiscal policies are prioritised over social
and economic development goals and the available
resource envelope is limited (Norton 2004). 
In sum, the IMF and government should no longer
debate how much public spending would need to be
restricted in order to meet single-digit inflation or to
keep government from borrowing. Instead, the IMF
should refrain from pre-empting government policy
decisions by imposing specific policy conditions in
their lending and surveillance programmes.
Parliaments, civil society, the education and fin a n c e
ministries should work together to align and transform
macroeconomic policies to meet basic rights and
achieve development goals as well as goals for
growth. The IMF, alongside other agencies such as
UNDP, could be a valuable source of technical
advice, but only if they provide a range of policy
options to enable governments and other
stakeholders – including parliaments and civil society
– to make informed choices about macroeconomic
policies, wage bills and the level of social spending. 
Projection models accommodate 
long-term factors
There are models in existence that project the
economic returns to education over the long term.
The Threshold 21 (T21) model developed by the
Millennium Institute was used in both Malawi and
Mozambique.25 The model integrates economic,
social and environmental objectives over a 10-30-
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25 For more information, see www.millennium-institute.org/index.html 
year framework and tries to assess the economic
returns and impact of public investment. A multi-
sectoral approach allows for different stakeholders
to come to the negotiating table to discuss the
trade-offs between prioritising certain policies over
others, and can therefore be an effective planning
tool. In Malawi, T21 was used to prepare its long-
term development plan, Vision 2020, and informed
the PRSP. In Mozambique, government and civil
society officials came together to discuss and adapt
T21 to the national context. The model influenced
the social objectives the government chose to
prioritise in the PRSP. However, to date the use of
this model has been limited. It has primarily been
used to determine the impact that specific
agriculture and HIV and AIDS policies would have on
growth, and not to explore alternative
macroeconomic frameworks nor to clearly account
for gender disparities. There is a clear need to build
the capacity of government and civil society to use
such models to understand and explore alternative
macroeconomic policies.
In order to run different projections however,
countries must have a comprehensive, credible and
reliable database of macroeconomic variables;
accurate assessment of the number of teachers and
health workers needed; and long-term costings of
teachers and health workers, financing gaps, etc.
However, given the high level of informality that
exists in many developing countries, collecting
accurate statistical data proves difficult. This may
also mean a new way of calculating variables. For
example, even the economic indicators the IMF uses
– such as GDP or the national inflation rate – only
provide a partial image of the real economy. In
Malawi, the government has changed the way it
calculates GDP, given that the previous measure did
not capture small and medium-sized enterprises. It
is expected that this new measure will dramatically
change the estimated size of GDP as it did in
Tanzania, where a similar exercise found that GDP
was 40% higher than had been previously
estimated, meaning that government budgets could
also increase significantly over previous levels
without changing the ratio of public spending to
GDP. 
At present governments cannot enter into a
balanced dialogue with the IMF because the
macroeconomic model that frames the discussion 
is not only a condition for continuing to access IMF
financing but also for continuing to receive a clean
bill of health from the IMF. Going ‘off track’ with 
the IMF acts as a powerful signal for donors and
even investors to withdraw their own support.
Governments have little access to alternative
macroeconomic models or technical assistance on
macroeconomic policy form other sources, the IMF
does not offer alternative policies, and donors too
often endorse the IMF’s comparative advantage in
determining macroeconomic policy. Those voicing
alternative solutions are therefore few and far
between (Sogge 2006). However, with the
development of different models, like the UNDP’s
MDG needs framework and the Millennium Project’s
T21 model, governments should at least have the
opportunity to test out different scenarios in meeting
their development and social needs. 
4.2.2. Long-term predictable aid 
Given that all three countries are highly dependent
on aid, donors play a significant role in making
these national development plans a reality.
Unpredictable, uncoordinated and projected donor
aid given over a 3-to-5-year period effectively
undermines national development plans that span
over 10 to 15 years. For these plans to be effective,
they must be accompanied with long-term
financing. Without more long-term predictable aid
from other development partners, such plans will
never become a reality. This is a challenge to the
donor community – one which it will hopefully begin
to respond to at the major meeting on ‘Keeping our
Promises on Education’ scheduled for 2 May 2007
in Brussels. 
An estimated US$15 billion is needed each year to
ensure that every child can complete a good quality
primary education by 2015 and give second-chance
opportunities to young people and adults who have
missed out. There is an urgent need to front-load
increases in aid to education and to increase the
number of countries benefiting from the FTI. The
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current financing gap of US$750 million for countries
endorsed by the FTI must be closed immediately.
Donors should also confront the contradictions
between the stated aims of their aid portfolios and
support of stringent macroeconomic policies,
working with the IMF and governments to remove
conditions that prevent aid being spent on the
intended purposes and ensure that macroeconomic
policies provide the fiscal space required to absorb
and expend the aid. 
Following the example of Mozambique, in-country
education donors can also play a crucial role in
helping education ministries to challenge and
remove present wage bill ceilings where these block
the training and recruitment of urgently needed new
teachers. Donors must also demand that longer-
term perspectives are taken into account, enabling
planners to consider the long-term developmental
paybacks of strategic increases in public spending in
the short to medium terms. 
There is no doubt that long-term aid pledges can have
a positive impact on pushing countries to develop
more strategic national plans and that this can
encourage them to demand more fle x i b l e
macroeconomic policies. A month after the UK’s
pledge of long-term aid for education in April 2006,
African finance ministers, donors and representatives
from international finance institutions meeting in Abuja
agreed that the IMF needs to detail how frameworks
could be more flexible and how current budget ceilings
could be expanded. The IMF agreed to “. . . a s s i s t
individual countries to review their macroeconomic
frameworks with a view of strengthening and aligning
them towards scaling up for meeting MDG targets.”
Nevertheless, governments rightly fear using donor
resources to fund the recurrent budget for fear of
sustainability if donor funding is lost. There are,
however, alternative approaches that could be used
to map donor funding to government budget growth
in a sustainable way. Consider the following
example: the government of Malawi is expecting
GDP to grow at 6% each year, over and above
inflation. Accordingly, the government budget, set at
a fixed percentage of GDP, can also grow 6% each
year. If a constant share of the budget is allocated to
the education budget, it too will grow at 6% above
inflation each year. The diagram below shows that,
over a 10-year period, the education sector’s
recurrent budget would grow by 70%, from
MK11.0bn in year 1 (based on the 2006/7 budget
level), to MK18.6bn. This calculation uses 2006/7
prices; the increase is therefore real. 
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Sustainable medium-term donor funding 
If all of this additional resource were allocated to
teacher salaries, an additional 82,150 teachers with
an average monthly salary of MK 7,700 (adjusted for
inflation) could be included in the wage bill by year
10. This would bring the PTR down from 72:1 in
year 1 to 27:1 in year 10. Alternatively, 45,268
teachers could be recruited to bring the PTR to
40:1, leaving MK 3.8bn (US$ 27 million) to spend on
salary supplements, teachers housing or other
incentives. This would be enough to give teachers
an annual average of MK 44,000 – that’s equivalent
to a 47% increase in average salary. 
This growth would be achieved slowly and steadily
over the 10-year period. However, it is not
necessary to wait for 10 years for this to come
about. Donor funding, indicated by the pink line in
the diagram, could be introduced in year 1, on the
basis of a 10-year agreement, to top up the
government budget in year 1, up to the year 10
level. The funding could be steadily reduced by 6%
each year, and replaced by the natural growth in the
budget. By year 10, donor funding would be phased
out completely as government funding should have
caught up. As a result, donor funding front-loads
the government budget, providing an income-
smoothing effect and allowing the government to
spend today the income it expects to have in 10
years time. 
This approach would allow for a dramatic increase in
education spending in the short term, but with
limited and controlled reliance on donor funding.
This approach would of course require a reasonable
forecast of incomes for government, a 10-year
funding commitment from donors, and a clear
commitment from government about its year-on-
year allocations to the education sector. With careful
consideration given to medium-term revenue
forecasts and plans, a sensible level for the donor
top-up could be envisaged that would allow an
upsurge in education funding in the short term
without placing the government under any burden in
the medium term. This approach provides a realistic
alternative to the funding stalemate the education
sector currently faces and should therefore be
considered as a funding approach. 
However, to do this would require greater flexibility
in macroeconomic targets. The increase in the
education budget would represent a 3.5% increase in
the government’s share of GDP in year 1, falling to
1.9% by year 10. The limit on GDP share of government
expenditures would therefore need to be raised. 
Such an approach relies on donors to fill the gap.
Alternatively, and perhaps controversially,
governments could consider short-term increases in
borrowing, matching the same principles as those
described above. 
A more complex model could also be developed
along these lines that factors in the economic
returns to investment in education – that would
begin to be felt after the first few years. We call on
the IMF, World Bank and UNDP to play an active
role in developing this sort of model in order to help
governments achieve their education and other
development goals.
4.2.3. Country-specific debate over the 
right mix of macroeconomic policies
In all three countries we found there to be very
little open debate over macroeconomic policies
beyond the few appointed officials in the MoF 
and Central Bank who were appointed to
negotiate with the IMF. These officials did not
always take the needs of other sectors, such as
education and health, into consideration when
agreeing to monetary and fiscal targets. Nor did
they consider the trade-off of sacrifices that they
meant for these sectors. For example, we found
that little dialogue took place at the planning 
stage of macro policies on how many teachers
were needed, and how the wage ceiling should 
be reflected in accordance to this. 
The government bodies in charge of fiscal (MoF) 
and monetary (Central Bank) policies must also
consult with ministries of education, health and
women’s affairs to determine the disparity in 
access to services between women and men.




In reality however, even if policy space was
expanded and such debates were taking place, 
few CSOs could actually engage at this level. They
need to build up their economic literacy to enable
them, to participate effectively in discussing
macroeconomic policies and alternatives. 
Unless scrutiny and engagement is strengthened on
the domestic front, the IMF will continue to be the
dominant voice, which has serious implications for
democracy, good governance and sovereignty. 
Of course it should not be necessary to wait for a
perfectly functioning civil society before demanding
greater flexibility from the IMF. But this demand can
become unstoppable if citizens are able to hold 
their own finance ministries accountable for the
macroeconomic policies they pursue and are fully
aware of the alternative options open to their
government. 
The achievement of education goals depends on the
recruitment of millions of trained teachers over the
coming years. It is time that macroeconomic policies
were framed to facilitate the achievement of this and
other key development goals. While this study is not
attempting to present an alternative, holistic model
for macroeconomic modelling, it is our intention to
demonstrate that the current processes are not the
only options available to governments. The
suggestions proposed in this section should be
considered as viable options for a new way forward
to meet the needs of developing education sectors
and the achievement of the MDGs. 
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To achieve the goal of giving every child a decent
education:
1. The IMF should stop attaching specific policy
conditions to their lending and surveillance
programmes, including on inflation, fiscal
deficits and wage bills. 
n Any policy advice it gives must provide a
range of policy options to enable governments
and other stakeholders, including parliaments
and civil society, to make informed choices
about macroeconomic policies, wage bills and
the level of social spending. 
n IMF policy advice should move away from
giving absolute primacy to short-run macro
stability and help countries move towards
long-term planning so that they can factor in
the returns to longer-run investments such as
education. They need to recognise education
as a productive investment and not just
government consumption.
n The IMF should engage in education policy
forums internationally (alongside the EFA
partners and civil society) and account for
how its interventions are supporting or
obstructing the achievement of education
goals.
n The IMF needs to make far-reaching changes
to vote and voice on its Executive Board so
that borrowing countries have a greater say in
the policies that affect them. 
2. Governments should determine, as part of
their long-term planning, staffing and pay
levels that are consistent with their education
goals and will permit the operation of a
motivated and professional teaching force on
a sustainable basis.
n Governments should develop costed long-term
education plans detailing the actual need for
teachers and resources for training in order to
provide quality learning outcomes for all girls
and boys. These education plans, along with
plans to achieve other development goals (for
example, in health, HIV and gender) should
underpin future macro-economic planning.
n These long-term plans must be supported by
an open debate led by the government and
national civil society (with advice from the IMF,
World Bank, UNDP and donors) about the best
mix of monetary and fiscal policies to deliver on
national priorities, whilst ensuring economic
stability.
n Ministries of finance need to build their
capacity to understand and use alternative
macroeconomic models, using this knowledge
to consider the full range of policies available to
them. 
n Finance ministries should also call for detailed
justification of targets and policies
recommended by the IMF, and need to be fully
transparent about any discussions they have
with the IMF; all loan agreements with the IMF
should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny
and review.
n Governments should demand more
predictable aid from donors to fill the resource
gaps; if this is not forthcoming, they should 
be free to explore other options to ensure





3. Donors need to keep their promises by
committing to close the annual US$15b
financing gap needed to achieve Education
for All with increased and predictable aid over
the long term. There is an urgent need to
front-load increases in aid to education and
to make more aid available for spending on
core costs, including salaries. 
n The EFA mid-term review process and 2008
EFA Global Monitoring Report must review
the contradictions between wage bill ceilings,
the continuing shortcomings in the provision
of donor aid and the achievement of
education goals.
n Donors can help to make the case for
investment in teachers as a major contributor
to economic growth, challenging the IMF’s
view of spending on teacher wages as
government ‘consumption’ when it should
rather be seen as productive investment.
4. Civil society organisations need to develop
their own economic literacy so they can
better scrutinise government budgets,
increase the sensitivity of budgets (to the
needs of girls, poor people and other
excluded groups) and engage in discussions
about alternative macroeconomic policies.
n They need to develop their ability to make the
case for increases in the share of the budget
for education and for increases in the overall
size of the national budget.
n They need to forge stronger links with
parliamentarians and the media in order to
ensure greater transparency of all
macroeconomic decision-making, ensuring
that what is presently decided behind closed
doors is decided fully in the public eye, with
clear awareness of the alternatives that exist
to the present IMF model. They also need to
call for justification for macroeconomic
targets, which are set according to
international standards rather than local
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Review of inflation literature:
Some empirical studies on ‘kinks’ in the relationship between inflation and growth
See bibliography for full reference. 
IMF papers Outside papers Estimated Inflation Threshold
Fisher (1993) 15-30 %
Bruno and Easterly (1998) 40%
Burdekin, et al (2000) 3% for developing countries
8% for industrialized countries
Gylfason and Herbertsson 10-20%
(2001)
Pollin and Zhu (2005) 15-18%
Bruno (1995) 20%
Barro (1996) Finds that a 10% increase in the annual inflation rate is associated 
on impact with a decline in GDP’s annual growth rate of only 0.24%. 
While this is interesting ,it does not justify IMF targeting inflation from a
moderate range of 10-20% into the mid-single digits in PRGFs
Sarel (1996) 8%
Khan and 11-12% for developing countries
Senhadji 1-3 % for industrialized countries
(2001)
Ghosh and Finds that the inflation-growth relationship is convex, so that the
Phillips decline in growth associated with an increase of 10-20% inflation is
(1998) much larger than that associated with moving from 40 to 50% inflation.
While this is interesting, it does not justify the IMF’s targeting of 




These projections are designed to provide a simple
illustration of the number of teachers that might be
required to meet the target PTR of 40:1 by 2015.
The enrolment and number of teachers at the start
of each school year is given. (This coincides with the
calendar year in the sample countries). Attrition rates
and the addition of extra teachers through training
are then applied, to give a total end of year number
of teachers. This end of year total provides the start
of year total for the following academic year, upon
which the PTR for that new year is based.
We run two alternative scenarios, the first adding
only those teachers that the governments currently
plan to train. In all three cases this includes a scaling
up of teacher training over the period. It should be
noted that the Ministries of Education do not
necessarily have the budgets for these extra
teachers, therefore this baseline calculation
represents a measure of the capacity of the sector,
rather than a guarantee of this number of teachers in
schools. 
The alternative scenario calculates the number of
teachers that would be required to be added to the
total teachers stock in any one year, to achieve a
target PTR in the following year. The end of year
target number of teachers is therefore the enrolment
rate of the following year, divided by the PTR target
rate for the following year. 
The wage bill estimates are for illustrative purposes
only. It should be noted that these do not exactly
match the Government budget allocations,
particularly in the case of Mozambique and Malawi.
This is partly because these basic salary rates do
not include the variety of allowances payable to
teachers, and also that this approach uses basic or
average grade salaries, whereas in reality there are 
a large number of different pay scale for different
grades of teachers (based on position and length of
service etc). It is also difficult to translate calendar
years into financial years, as half of each academic
year falls into a different financial year. Accordingly,
the wage bill estimate for 2006/7 is based on the
number of teachers at the mid point of 2006,
(assumed to be the teacher stock at the start of 
the year, less half of the total annual attrition), with
additional trained teachers being added in
September/October, allowing nine months of salary
for those teachers. 
These calculations are overly simple and should not
be used as an estimate of total budgetary needs.
However, they provide an illustration that allows 
the reader to consider the teacher training and
recruitment requirements over the period. Even a
simple forecast like this demonstrates that significant
increases in the training and recruitment of teachers
are required if we are to meet the target ratio of 40:1
by 2015. 
Annex 2 
A l t e rnative teacher projection scenarios
Alternative Teacher Projection Scenarios for Malawi
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current Outcomes
Enrolment 3 , 2 8 0 , 7 1 4 3 , 2 7 4 , 1 2 9 3 , 2 7 6 , 6 2 2 3 , 2 9 0 , 6 6 9 3 , 3 1 7 , 1 7 0 3 , 3 5 4 , 1 7 8 3 , 3 8 2 , 1 6 4 3 , 4 3 7 , 7 8 3 3 , 4 5 7 , 7 3 4 3 , 5 8 7 , 7 1 0
Total teachers 45,268 43,197 44,153 46,446 48,636 51,268 53,780 56,180 58,472 60,661
(start year)
PTR (start of the year) 72.5 75.8 74.2 70.8 68.2 65.4 62.9 61.2 59.1 59.1
Attrition (4.5% per year) -2,071 -1,944 -1,987 -2,090 -2,189 -2,307 -2,420 -2,528 -2,631 -2,730
Newly trained – 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500
pre service
Planned expansion 400 1,780 1,780 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320
of training
Total teachers (end year) 43,197 44,153 46,446 48,636 51,268 53,780 56,180 58,472 60,661 62,751
Planning for 40:1
Target PTR 72.5 70 66 62 58 54 50 46 43 40
(start of the year)
Total teachers 45,268 46773.3 49645.8 53075.3 57192.6 62114.4 67643.3 74734.4 80412.4 89692.8
(start of the year)
Attrition (4.5% per year) -2071 -2104.8 -2234.1 -2388.4 -2573.7 -2795.1 -3043.9 -3363 -3618.6 -4036.2
Newly trained – 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500
pre service
Planned expansion 400 1,780 1,780 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320 2,320
of training
Additional teachers 3576.3 2077.3 1383.6 2225.7 2675.5 3504 5315.1 4221.1 8078.9
required
Total teachers (end year) 46,773 49,646 53,075 57,193 62,114 67,643 74,734 80,412 89,693 90,477   
2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Average monthly wage 7,700 8,239 8,651 9,083 9,538 10,015 10,515 11,041 11,593 12,173 
Inflationary wage 7% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
increase
Total wage bill current 4,278 4,582 5,020 5,527 6,106 6,734 7,395 8,090 8,820 9,588 
scenario (MK m)
Total wage bill 40:1 4,526 5,098 5,711 6,447 7,336 8,383 9,687 11,023 12,784 13,925
scenario (MK m)
Note that this average wage rate does not reconcile exactly with the wage bill in the budget as the latter allows for additional allowances and the salaries of head
teachers etc. 
Note that the Government of Malawi budgets only for in post teachers at the start of any financial year, therefore the additional teachers who graduate in September/
October are not included in the financial year budget estimates, rather, must access the budget by supplementary mid year. This is not an efficient way to
budget, and therefore they have been included here. 
The model is based on our own estimates of population growth, but this provides a similar 2015 to that stated by the Ministry of Education. Salary rates were
provided for 2006/7, but the amount are estimated assuming a standard inflationary increase for the rest of the period. 
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Alternative Teacher Projection Scenarios for Mozambique
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current Outcomes
Enrolment 3 , 6 5 8 , 4 1 8 3 , 7 5 7 , 1 5 8 3 , 8 6 8 , 9 8 3 3 , 8 8 2 , 6 5 9 3 , 8 5 2 , 9 0 5 3 , 9 4 5 , 3 7 5 4 , 0 4 0 , 0 6 4 4 , 1 3 7 , 0 2 5 4 , 2 3 6 , 3 1 4
Total teachers 47,193 51,305 55,753 60,023 64,622 69,537 74,256 78,785 83,134
(start year)
PTR (start of the year) 77.5 73.2 69.4 64.7 59.6 56.7 54.4 52.5 51
Attrition (4.5% per year) -1,888 -2,052 -2,230 -2,401 -2,585 -2,781 -2,970 -3,151 -3,325
Newly trained – 6000 6500 6500 7000 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
pre service
Total teachers (end year) 51,305 55,753 60,023 64,622 69,537 74,256 78,785 83,134 87,309
of whom are (10+2) 9,130 7,321 7,453 7,387 7,243 6953 6675 6408 6152
g r a d e
Planning for 40:1
Target PTR 77.5 72 67 62 57 52 48 44 40
(start of the year
Total teachers 47,193 52182.8 57746 62623.5 67594.8 75872.6 84168 94023.3 105907.8
(start of the year)
Attrition (4% per year) -1887.7 -2087.3 -2309.8 -2504.9 -2703.8 -3034.9 -3366.7 -3760.9 -4236.3
Newly trained – 6000 6500 6500 7000 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500
pre service
Additional teachers 877.5 1150.6 687.4 476.2 3481.6 3830.3 5722 8145.5
required
Total teachers (end year) 52,183 57,746 62,624 67,595 75,873 84,168 94,023 105,908 109,172
2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Average teacher salary 211 222 233 245 257 270 283 297
(10+2) (US$)(month)
Average teacher salary 100 105 110 115 121 127 134 140
10+1 (US$) (month)
Inflationary wage 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
increase
Total wage bill current 75.228 82.190 92.481 103.558 115.872 128.830 142.493 156.897
scenario (MK m)
Total wage bill 40:1 76.016 84.399 95.844 107.728 124.083 143.091 165.595 193.365
scenario (MK m)
The number of 10+2 teachers is based on information from the Government of Mozambique up to 2010, we have assumed the number falls
thereafter at the average rate of attrition.
Assume 5% inflationary increase in the wage rate each year. 
Uses Government of Mozambique enrolment projections up to 2010, assuming an annual 2.4% increase in enrolment from 2011/12 p.a. which is
the rate of population growth.
Note that the total wage bill amount here does not reconcile with the GoM MTEF, although the staffing rates and salary rates are the same.  Their total is
US$112m for 2007, therefore additional allowances or higher salaries for head teachers etc may be included there.  This analysis provides a basis
for comparison of the scale of increase for basic salaries only. 
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Alternative Teacher Projection Scenarios for Sierra Leone
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Current Outcomes
Enrolment 1 , 0 2 5 , 7 9 3 9 9 8 , 9 9 1 9 8 2 , 5 1 7 9 5 5 , 0 5 9 9 9 0 , 6 0 1 1 , 0 1 5 , 8 3 4 1 , 0 5 2 , 7 0 1 1 , 0 7 8 , 4 7 2 1 , 1 1 6 , 7 0 7
Total teachers 18,038 19,503 20,916 22,280 23,596 23,901 24,196 24,480 24,754
(start year)
PTR (start of the year) 56.9 51.2 47.0 42.9 42.0 42.5 43.5 44.1 45.1
Attrition (3.5% per year) -631 -683 -732 -780 -826 -837 -847 -857 -866
Newly trained – 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
pre service
Distance training 965 965 965 965
Total teachers (end year) 19,503 20,916 22,280 23,596 23,901 24,196 24,480 24,754 25,019
Planning for 40:1
Target PTR 56.9 51 47 42 41 40 40 40 40
(start of the year)
Total teachers 18,038 19588.1 21129.4 22739.5 24161.0 25395.8 26317.5 26961.8 27917.7
(start of the year)
Attrition (3.5% per year) -631 -686 -740 -796 -846 -889 -921 -944 -977
Newly trained – 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
pre service
Planned expansion 965 965 965 965
of training
Additional teachers 85.4 130.9 253.6 121.4 949.5 679.5 434.4 768.6 823.2
required
Total teachers (end year) 19,588 21,129 22,740 24,161 25,396 26,318 26,962 27,918 28,895
2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Average monthly wage 216,538 227,970 236,086 247,767 256,715 261,883 271,121 276,366
Inflationary wage 5% 4% 5% 4% 2% 4% 2%
increase
Total wage bill current 51,776 58,586 64,747 72,076 76,575 79,092 82,857 85,419
scenario (MK m)
Total wage bill 40:1 51,942 59,093 65,900 73,737 80,539 85,473 90,941 95,705
scenario (MK m)
Note that this average wage rate does not reconcile exactly with the wage bill in the budget as the latter allows for additional allowances and the salaries
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